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DRUGS AND ALCOHOL IN THE WORKPLACE:
TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND POLICY
William F. Adams and Cynthia L. Remmers*
I. INTRODUCTION
The workplace today is rapidly becoming a haven for illegal
drug use, sale and possession.1 Many employees are using and sell-
ing drugs on the job and are often using pilfered company property
as the "currency" with which to buy drugs.2 Meanwhile, alcohol
abuse remains an important, unresolved problem that employers
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& Sutcliffe. She received her J.D. from the Boalt Hall School of Law, University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley in 1980. She was a law clerk to Judge Thomas Tang of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and a judicial extern to the late Justice Mathew 0.
Tobriner of the Supreme Court of California. Both authors specialize in labor and employ-
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and on other employment related topics.
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1. See generally Bureau of National Affairs, BNA SPECIAL REPORT, ALCOHOL &
DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE: COSTS, CONTROLS AND CONTROVERSIES (1986) (examining
the "staggering financial and human costs of drug and alcohol abuse in the workplace")
(hereinafter cited as "BNA SPECIAL REPORT, ALCOHOL & DRUGS"); see Bensinger, Drugs in
the Workplace, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 48. The use of drugs in the workplace
is not remote or isolated but reflects national drug use patterns and trends. See Schrein, A
Survey of Drug Abuse in Organizations, PERSONNEL J. 478-79 (June 1983) ("Well over 80%
of the organizations that responded to the survey reported that since 1975 they have had to
deal directly with drug problems.") Nor is drug use confined to one occupation or type of
employment, eg. unskilled or blue collar workers. And the public is finally recognizing that
drug use is an occupational hazard for health care workers (eg., physicians, nurses, dentists
and pharmacists). See SMrrH & WESSON, Substance Abuse in Industry: Identification, Inter-
vention, Treatment and Prevention, in SUBSTANCE ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE (D. Smith,
D. Wesson, F. Zerkin & J. Novey eds., 1985) (hereinafter referred to as SMITH & WESSON).
2. SMITH & WESSON, supra note 1, at 6. See also, M. MALONE, THE BIG SCORE, THE
BILLION DOLLAR STORY OF SILICON VALLEY (1985). (Doug Southard, -a Santa Clara
County district attorney, estimates that Silicon Valley loses $20 million in electronics parts
and equipment each year. Much of that amount is presumably used directly or indirectly to
purchase drugs).
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must address.3 Employees who work while intoxicated by drugs or
alcohol present a grave safety hazard to themselves, their co-work-
ers and the general public.' If their behavior is not checked or chal-
lenged, these employees can literally destroy a business enterprise.'
Moreover, apart from theft and safety problems, drug or alcohol-
impaired employees are singularly unproductive, error prone and
unreliable.'
Employers have begun to recognize the serious problem cre-
ated by drug and alcohol abuse and have begun to fight back.7
3. BNA SPECIAL REPORT, ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note 1, at 12-13 (arguing that
despite the media's attention on drugs, alcohol remains the most important substance abuse
problem for American workplaces). Alcohol is technically a drug, but for clarity the term
"alcohol" may be referred to separately in this Article.
4. See McCleod v. City of Detroit, 39 FEP Cas. 225, (E.D. Mich. 1985); Everett v.
Napper, 632 F. Supp. 1481 (N.D. Ga. 1986); see also Williams, Peat, Crouch, Wells & Finkle,
Drugs in Fatally Injured Young Male Drivers, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
PUBLIC HEALTH REP., Jan.-Feb., 1985, at 19.
Even marijuana, previously thought by many to be harmless, is considered by experts
today to be a potent drug. This is due to the increased concentration of THC, marijuana's
psychoactive ingredient, in forms of that drug now available on the street:
Since 1975, the concentration of delta 9 - THC in seized contraband has trip-
led and currently averages 3.6% delta 9 - THC. Much "street pot" in the
United States is now at least as potent as hashish. Sinsemilla, a highly potent
type of marijuana that is produced by harvesting only high quality, unpol-
linated, pistillate (female) plants contains between 6% and 7% delta 9 - THC.
All daily smokers of marijuana in our study preferentially used sinsemilla.
Schwartz, Hayden & Riddile, Laboratory Detection of Mariuana Use: Experience With a
Photometric Immunoassy to Measure Urinary Cannibinoids, AM. J. Dis. CHILD, November,
1985, at 1093, citing Quarterly Report: Potency Monitoring Project (1984). For an example of
work-related hazards from marijuana use see infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
5. BNA SPECIAL REPORT, ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra note 1, at 7-9 (cost of drug
abuse estimated at $500 to $1000 per employee); see also Bensinger, supra note 1, at 48 (point-
ing out that the problems and dimensions are difficult to quantify, but in 1981 the cost to
businesses of employee drug use was estimated to be $16.4 billion).
6. BNA SPECIAL REPORT, ALCOHOL & DRUGS, supra, note 1, at 7 ("Substance abus-
ers are absent from work two and one-half times as often as other workers and their average
productivity as measured by verbal, written, psychological and physical testing is 25 to 33
percent lower than what it would be otherwise. They end up costing their employers money,
time and safety in the form of medical benefits, absenteeism, accidents and injuries." (Quoting
in part, address by Peter R. Bensinger to Maine Chamber of Commerce and Industry, March
7, 1986.) Rothstein, Screening Workers For Drugs: A Legal and Ethical Framework, 11
EMPL. REL. L.J. 422 (1985) ("According to some estimates drug abuse costs the economy as
much as $25 billion annually in lost productivity (e.g., absenteeism, mistakes and sick leave)
not to mention the increased insurance costs and loss of good will.") See also Clayton, Extent
and Consequences of Drug Abuse, 14 PHARMCHEM NEWSLETTER, No. 2, Mar.-Apr., 1985;
Diegelman, Substance Abuse: The Business Approach, in SMiTH & WESSON, supra note 1, at
51 (1985).
7. Employer anti-drug efforts serve many of the same public policy ends as the well-
publicized efforts of law enforcement, school and health officials. See Report to the President,
Commission on Organized Crime, America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking and Organ-
ized Crime, (1986). The report recommends applicant drug screening and employee drug
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Although employers across the country are beginning to respond,
the high-technology companies in California's Santa Clara Valley,
known as "Silicon Valley," are widely recognized as the front line
of the recently intensified battle. The Silicon Valley effort has been
a direct response to drug and alcohol problems perceived among
electronics and high-technology workers.8
Many of the procedures developed by employers to control in-
creasing substance abuse have been plagued by legal uncertainty
and general misunderstanding, and for good reason. Typically, em-
ployers and employees alike lack the understanding of drug and al-
cohol detection technology and methods necessary to assure their
proper and effective use. Moreover, the potential governing law in-
volves an amalgam of newly emerging doctrine and well-established
but complex constitutional, statutory and common law principles.
This Article is intended to assist the employee relations com-
munity to develop and/or implement reasonable drug and alcohol
policies with the least possible legal risk. The Article focuses on
California and federal law, but includes significant developments in
other jurisdictions as well. In particular, California decisional au-
thority and proposed legislation provide rich examples of the devel-
oping legal and public controversy that may reflect likely
developments in other states.
The Article is divided into four sections: (1) the use of and
legal issues concerning testing methodologies, including emerging
rights of privacy; (2) the use of and legal issues concerning other
investigatory methods, including electronic surveillance, polygraph
tests, undercover agents, review of medical and arrest records and
searches of employee possessions; (3) legal issues concerning use of
information learned in the investigatory phase, including civil rights
laws, handicap discrimination and common law tort doctrines; and
(4) practical advice for disciplining employees suspected of sub-
stance abuse.
The basic premise of this Article is that knowledgeable em-
testing with "zero tolerance" for all federal employers. It also recommends that private em-
ployers institute similar programs in their workforces. Id. at 4 4. Controlling drug use by
employees may reduce drug trafficking by reducing demand. Indeed, the link between reduc-
tion of drug trafficking and reduced demand for drugs is explicitly recognized in the Commis-
sion's report. Id. at 432.
8. See M. MALONE, supra note 2, at 409. The number of workers on Silicon Valley
manufacturing lines who are heavy drug users is uncertain. "Companies say no more than a
small percentage .... [Drug users] claim that in some departments and on some shifts the
number may be as high as 90 percent. The truth probably lies somewhere in between." Id.
Interestingly, many of these Silicon Valley firms have developed the technology and equip-
ment now employed to detect drug and alcohol use.
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ployers can, lawfully yet decisively, take steps to rid their work-
places of drugs and alcohol. That is not to say that a drug or
alcohol testing program is appropriate for every employer. In addi-
tion to the complex legal issues raised by testing, employers must
weigh the employee relations impact and expense against the antici-
pated benefits before deciding whether to implement a testing pro-
gram. Indeed, all employers should consider less problematic
alternatives before resorting to chemical detection methods.
If an employer determines such a testing program is war-
ranted, however, it can minimize legal risks while still taking effec-
tive action if armed with some basic principles that are discussed
below.
Employers may rightly presume that efforts to reduce or elimi-
nate drug or alcohol use in the workplace are generally job-related,
no matter what job an individual employee may hold. Nevertheless,
the testing or investigation methods an employer selects have vary-
ing degrees of job relatedness and intrusiveness that can affect both
employee acceptance and legal risk. An employer's ability to mini-
mize these risks appears directly linked to the degree to which an
anti-drug or alcohol program is tailored to each particular work-
place. The more an employer focuses on preserving employee dig-
nity and enlisting employee cooperation in a combined effort to
eradicate the ill effects of drug and alcohol use, the less the legal
risk.
II. TESTING FOR DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE: EMERGING
EMPLOYEE LEGAL RIGHTS
In recent years, concerned employers have supplemented or re-
placed subjective, observational approaches9 to identifying drug or
alcohol impaired employees with a number of highly sophisticated
methods that use instruments and techniques from the fields of ana-
lytical chemistry, immunochemistry and toxicology.' 0 Usually
9. Subjective or observational methods include: (1) observation of "physiological signs
associated with drug use (e.g., pupil size, tremor) or evidence of recent drug use (e.g., fresh
needle marks)" and (2) "behavioral observations (e.g., slurred speech, unsteady gait, mood
changes, irritability)." Smith & Wesson, supra note 1, at 12. A detailed list of behavioral or
observational attributes designed for use by supervisors to identify impaired employees is
contained in Human Resources Division, Edison Electric Institute, EEl Guide to Effective
Drug and Alcohol/Fitness for Duty Policy Development 11-17 (1985).
10. A recent survey by the Bureau of Business Practices, a division of Simon and
Schuster, Inc., indicates that 25% of Fortune 500 companies presently test their employees or
applicants for drug use and an additional 11% are considering such tests. S.F Examiner,
October 17, 1985, at C-1, col. 5. Recently, for example, the Federal Railroad Administration
enacted regulations calling for mandatory drug and alcohol testing of railway operating em-
[Vol. 2
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these methods analyze urine samples supplied by employees at the
employer's request. Some of the detection techniques include im-
munoassays, thin-layer chromatography, gas chromatography, high
performance liquid chromatography and gas chromatography/mass
spectrometry (GC/MS).11
These test methods are presently lawful in all states, 2 but their
use to test employees or applicants raises both privacy questions
and employee relations issues. In order to understand how those
concerns arise, it is necessary to explore the various testing methods
currently in use.
A. Employer Drug Testing Practices
1. Pre-Employment Screening
It is axiomatic that to avoid charges of discriminatory treat-
ment, an employer should administer pre-employment drug tests on
a non-discriminatory basis. Employers need not administer them to
all applicants, however; an employer might choose the more eco-
nomical option of testing only those applicants who have advanced
beyond an initial interview stage.1 3 It presently appears that em-
ployees. See 50 Fed. Reg. 31508 (August 2, 1985). The regulations require post-accident
toxicological testing and authorize railroads to require breath and urine tests upon reasonable
cause. The regulations also require railroads to adopt policies to aid in the identification of
"troubled employees" and to provide for pre-employment drug screens and improved report-
ing of drug and alcohol involvement in train accidents. The regulations are currently in effect
pending appellate review.
11. See generally Schwartz & Hawks, Laboratory Detection of Marijuana Use, J.
A.M.A., August 9, 1985, at 788; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF DRUG ABUSE, RESEARCH MON-
OGRAPH No. 42, The Analysis of Cannibinoids in Biological Fluids (1982); Smith & Wesson,
supra note 1.
12. Employers in each particular state should consult local law to determine if there are
special privacy or other restrictions applicable to the use of any particular device or method.
In addition, employees should closely monitor pending legislation in this fast developing area
since some employee and civil liberties advocacy and labor groups have expressed concern
over unrestricted testing by employers. In response to such concerns, for example, the City
and County of San Francisco enacted a restrictive municipal ordinance that bars most blood,
urine or encephalographic tests as a condition of employment. S.F. MUNICIPAL (POLICE)
CODE § 3300 A et seq. See Appendix A.
An Oregon law forbids use of breath analyzer-type tests unless there are reasonable
grounds to believe the person is under the influence of "intoxicating liquor." Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 659.225.
13. A good strategy might be to test before final employment decisions have been made
and while there are still multiple eligible candidates. If any candidates fail, there may remain
others who can be selected. In this way the test results can be used as a factor in the final
decision without necessarily being the only factor. This method of decision-making reduces
the likelihood of a successful challenge based upon Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
42 U.S.C. § 2003-I et seq. (West 1983); see Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). Title
VII protection applies both to applicants and existing employees.
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ployers are free to lawfully reject any applicant who fails a properly
administered test or refuses to take one.
Employers hope that the existence of the drug testing program
will deter most drug users from applying as well as detect those who
do apply. Somewhat ironically, the deterrence of drug-using appli-
cants is probably more valuable than the detection of drug use after
an application has been made. Many potential applicants who use
drugs may assume that the test will detect any past or current drug
use and will not apply for employment.
In fact, the tests for nearly all drugs of abuse have pre-set cut-
off values14 or low detection limits.1 5  In most cases a laboratory
will be unable to detect or will not report the presence of drugs
taken more than a few days prior to the test.I6 To avoid detection,
a drug user generally need only abstain from most drugs, including
marijuana, for a week or less.7 Chronic daily marijuana users, on
the other hand, may need to abstain for up to three to four weeks to
avoid detection, depending on the individual's previous level of use
and the sensitivity of the test.1 8 Thus, apart from its in terrorem
effect, pre-employment testing should be expected to eliminate only
a few of the actual drug users who take the test. And, in addition to
ignoring the potential for pre-test abstinence by drug users, pre-em-
ployment testing fails to identify those employees who begin using
drugs after being hired.
Nonetheless, pre-employment testing has at least one advan-
tage over other testing practices; employee consent for the testing is
easier to obtain when it is made part of the application process.
Individuals seeking employment are not likely to balk at signing a
written consent form.19 In turn, the existence of an appropriate
14. A "cut-off value" refers to the concentration of a drug that will be reported by a
laboratory as a positive indication that the drug or its metabolites are present in a sample.
See SMITH & WESSON, supra note 1, at 14.
15. The "low detection limit" of a test procedure refers to the concentration level below
which a particular drug is undetectable by that method. Id. at 16.
16. Id. at 15; see also Sedgewick, Cannibinoid Analysis: Problems and Interpretation, 14
PHARMCHEM NEWSLETrER, No. 1, Jan.-Feb., 1975, at 6-7. Use of a higher cut-off value
will shorten the length of time in which the presence of a particular drug will be reported as
positive. A higher cut-off value also will have the effect of reducing the number of uncon-
firmed positive results when immunoassay tests are used at their lower detection limits (e.g.
20 nanograms per milliliter for marijuana), while the confirmatory test is less sensitive. See
Fodey, J. A.M.A., Dec. 27, 1985, at 3425 (reply of Schwartz and Hawks to letter to editor).
17. See SMITH & WESSON, supra note 1, at 15.
18. Id. Using common immunoassay techniques the detection limit will usually be con-
siderably less than the period stated in the text. See generally Sedgewick, supra note 16.
19. For an example of such a form, see Human Resources Division, Edison Electric In-
stitute, EEl Guide to Effective Drug and Alcohol/Fitness for Duty Policy Development, 30
[Vol. 2
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consent form increases the likelihood that the testing will not be
considered a violation of the applicant's privacy interests. After an
individual has entered the workforce the employer's seemingly un-
fettered discretion is narrowed by the array of rights and privileges
that state and federal laws afford employees.
2. Testing Current Employees "For Cause"
An employer may wish to test "for cause" when an employee
exhibits possible symptoms or behavioral signs of drug or alcohol
use or is thought to be a user. Most employer policies require that
the degree of "cause" or suspicion regarding an employee's possible
drug use be more than a mere hunch or rumor. Of course, absent
an admission on the employee's part, an employer probably will
have no certainty that drug use is involved until a test is performed.
Thus, "for cause" testing policies typically rely upon some degree of
reasonable suspicion before testing is triggered.
An employer can best bolster the case for testing a particular
employee by supplementing suspicion with on-the-job observations.
By carefully watching behavioral patterns, physical manifestations
and/or gathering other circumstantial evidence (such as drug para-
phernalia), an employer can more likely select those employees who
exhibit present impairments or specific behavior patterns signalling
possible drug abuse. This type of informed "for cause" selection
method is certainly the most job-related and supportable.
"For cause" selection methods that rely in part upon observa-
tions and other evidence place the ensuing tests in a better light.
For example, in the absence of testing, an employer normally will
discipline an employee (or refer him or her for rehabilitation) on the
basis of observations that indicate impairment. Adding a drug de-
tection test, then, may be in an employee's interest. The test will
either confirm the observations or demonstrate to a significant de-
gree of certainty that the individual was wrongly identified. And,
the employee is probably no worse off for having submitted to test-
ing than if the employer had simply relied upon the observations
and taken what it believed to be appropriate disciplinary action on
that basis.
Another "for cause" method calls for drug testing following
certain types of on-the-job accidents or incidents. The occurrence
of a specific incident or type of incident triggers the testing, but may
not in itself suggest anything about the condition of the employee in
(1985). In California such consent forms must comply with the textual and print size re-
quirements of CAL. CIV. CODE § 56 et seq.
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question. On the other hand, the type of incident used for selection
may actually be among the observational indicia of possible drug
impairment (e.g., repeated accidents). In the latter case, an em-
ployer's testing request becomes more reasonable and supportable.
In any event, supervisors who administer detection programs
should be trained to document their own observations at the time of
the testing.
3. Random, Periodic and "Fitness for Duty" Testing
Unlike "for cause" testing, where employees are selected for
testing on the basis of observed information, random or periodic
testing selection policies do not rely upon evidence of specific em-
ployee impairment. Random testing is considered to be more objec-
tionable to employees, particularly when an arbitrary selection
method is used. Random testing also faces the greatest uncertainty
in the courts because job relatedness is more difficult to demon-
strate. Consequently, random or periodic test methods are proba-
bly justified only when use of drugs or alcohol on the job would
involve significant safety, health or economic impacts.
Since testing takes time, it is not always suitable in a pre-work
"fitness-for-duty" context. Usually the samples must be delivered
or mailed to a commercial laboratory for processing, and the results
are not available immediately.2" Moreover, periodic testing (such
as in conjunction with annual employee physicals) may lose effec-
tiveness if individuals are given too much advance notice of the date
of the testing. An individual may defeat the purpose of the tests by
abstaining from drug use until after the test. One approach that
may avoid this problem would be to provide notice of a range of
dates upon which testing could occur. The uncertain date and the
expanded window for testing may make it more difficult for employ-
ees to abstain.
4. Post-Identification Monitoring
Many employers provide identified drug users with an oppor-
tunity to remain employed subject to periodic monitoring. Such a
policy typically provides that the employer and employee agree on
the consequences of a subsequent positive test result and on the
length of the monitoring period.
An employee assistance program(EAP)21 can provide the nec-
20. See generally Allen, Drug Screening Methodologies, 12 PHARMCHEM NEWSLET-
TER, No. 5, Sept.-Oct., 1983, at 1; Sedgewick, supra note 16.
21. See infra note 267-69 and accompanying text. Employee assistance programs
[Vol. 2
DR UGS AND ALCOHOL IN THE WORKPLACE
essary post-identification monitoring on a confidential basis, if an
employer has one. The employer need only set the standard for the
monitoring program. The employee assistance program itself can
be arranged so that employee participation is anonymous, thereby
encouraging self-referrals. As a matter of policy, an employer prob-
ably should halt post-identification monitoring when it is reasonable
to conclude that the employee has been drug free for some signifi-
cant period of time (e.g., for several months to a year).
Post-identification monitoring may raise most directly the
question whether employee consent to such monitoring is valid
since continued employment may be conditioned upon the consent.
Indeed, all testing policies generally rely upon some form of explicit
or implied consent on the part of employees.
The argument in support of the validity of such consents is that
an employer's ability to regulate work-related behavior is funda-
mental to the employer-employee relationship. Discipline for fail-
ure to take drug tests can be analogized to discipline for the
breaking of any other announced workplace rule. If the required
tests are otherwise supportable, then, it is unlikely (although not
impossible) that courts would conclude employee consents are inva-
lid simply because discipline or discharge is the consequence for
failure to comply.
B. Uses and Limitations of Drug Testing Technology
As testing of employees or applicants increases, so does the
need for managers to understand the uses and limitations of testing
technology. Generally, test methods that are appropriate for work-
place testing should be sufficiently precise and exacting to support
the employer's disciplinary action required by a positive result.
Commercial laboratories use a variety of procedures.22 Urine
tests are the most common. Sophisticated analytical equipment, in-
cluding gas chromatograph/mass spectrometers, can detect even
minute amounts of drugs in a urine sample up to several days after
("EAPs") are work-based programs designed to maintain or improve employee efficiency
through assessment, diagnosis or referrals in connection with personal problems affecting
employee performance. Among the range of problems that EAP providers seek to identify or
address are drug or alcohol abuse problems that may be affecting work performance. See
Proposed Changes in the Regulations of the Commissioner of Corporations under the Knox-
Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975 Pursuant to Notice of Proposed Changes, Califor-
nia Dept. of Corps., Document OP 30/85-B, April 1, 1986. See also Duff & Hisayasu, What
EAPs Should Know About Proper Drug Monitoring, THE ALMACAN, Dec., 1985, at 28-29.
22. Allen, supra note 20, at 4.
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ingestion.23 Other tests, such as blood tests, are also available.24
The time factors for detectability depend on the type of test, the
drug, the amount ingested, and a number of other factors.25 For
example, certain test methods are so sensitive that a single human
hair could be used to detect chronic cocaine or heroin use.26
No single test procedure or analytical instrument is ideal for all
needs. Test methods vary substantially in their cost, accuracy, time
required for analysis, selectivity and sensitivity.27 For example, a
highly selective procedure may make fine distinctions among speci-
mens having similar chemical formulae, but it may be relatively
costly and slow for mass screening programs.28 For these reasons, a
variety of approaches has evolved.
1. Drug Testing Methodologies
At present, laboratories usually first employ a relatively low
cost screening procedure backed up by a more expensive but selec-
tive and accurate technique to confirm any positive results.29 Two
of the most popular initial screening methods are thin layer
chromatography (TLC) and immunochemical tests called
"immunoassays." 3 °
a. Thin Layer Chromatography
TLC is a commonly used and relatively inexpensive urine drug
screening method. The TLC method takes advantage of the fact
that various drugs interact differently with solvents that are drawn
upward by capillary action through a concentrated sample on a pre-
pared test plate.3 The plate is then treated with other chemicals
that react with the drugs to create color complexes that can be com-
pared to laboratory reference standards.3 2 These standards can be
constantly updated as new drugs are formulated. By using addi-
23. SMITH & WESSON, supra note 1, at 15. See also Sedgewick, supra note 16, at 15.
24. Allen, supra note 20, at 1.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id. at 3-4. The confirmation of a THC sample by gas chromatograph/mass spec-
trometry costs a minimum of $50 per sample. The cost of immunoassays which can also
cover a wide range of drugs is only a few dollars per sample. See also O'Connor & Rejent,
EMIT Cannabinoid Assay: Confirmation by RIA and GC/MS, 5 J. ANALYTICAL TOxICOL-
OGY 168, 172 (1981).
29. See generally Allen, supra note 20.
30. See SMITH & WESSON, supra note 1, at 14.
31. Allen, supra note 20, at 1.
32. Id. at 1-2.
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tional solvents on the same plate, a laboratory chemist can screen
for additional drugs or distinguish between similar drugs.
TLC is used most often in drug detoxification clinics, metha-
done maintenance programs, testing of parolees and prison inmates
and other large-scale screening programs, including industrial
screening. 3 TLC results must be interpreted by a skilled technician
and, if used alone, can produce false positives.34 Therefore, a con-
firmatory test is required.
b. Immunoassay Tests
A second initial screening technique, immunoassay systems,
such as the Syva Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique
(EMIT),35 is very common in employee testing and other large scale
programs.36 This technique uses antibodies that are created by the
immune systems of laboratory animals in response to an injection of
prepared forms of a drug.37
Immunoassay tests are not problem-free. They rapidly screen
for a variety of drugs, including marijuana and cocaine, and are
typically used together with a second, confirmatory test.38  Drug-
33. Id. at 2.
34. SMrrHi & WEssON, supra note 1, at 14. False positives are initial screening results
that are not confirmed by a subsequent test. It is possible that newer formulations on the
market using TLC methods will eliminate or reduce the number of false positives. False
positives are rare using the EMIT immunoassay system "if the technologist performing the
test is experienced and proper procedures of laboratory quality control are followed."
Schwartz & Hawks, supra note 11, at 788.
35. This particular method is marketed by Syva Company, Palo Alto, California.
36. For example, the United States Navy began using immunoassay tests in the wake of
some highly publicized accidents that were potentially drug related. Morgan, Problems of
Mass Urine Screening for Misused Drugs, in SMITH & WESSON, supra note 1, at 21.
37. See generally Allen, supra note 20. A chart comparing the sensitivity levels of vari-
ous urine analysis methods appears in SMrrH & WESSON, supra note 1, at 14.
38. Obvious human variation factors that reduce quantitative accuracy include body
weight, kidney function, urinary acidity, diet, stress and physical activity levels.
The EMIT-s.t. (single test) formulation is relatively inexpensive (approximately $3,500
per kit complete with a compact spectrophotometer) and it is designed for small laboratories
and physicians' offices. Schwartz & Hawks, supra note 11, at 788. For marijuana, the EMIT-
s.t. method has a 100 ng/ml sensitivity and is designed to detect 200 ng/ml of 1 1-nor-delta 9
-THC-9-arboxylic acid (9-carboxy-THC) with 95% sensitivity. Syva Company, Clinical
Summary Addendum: EMIT d.a.u. and EMIT-st. Urine Cannabinoid Assays (1982); see also
Schwartz, Hayden & Riddile, supra note 4, at 1093. The authors, who studied 70 adolescent
and young adult marijuana users, concluded that the EMIT-s.t. method had excellent speci-
ficity for detecting recent marijuana use. Urinary cannabinoids could be detected in subjects
with a history of chronic, heavy use for an average of thirteen days after cessation of use. The
detection period fell to forty-eight hours for two subjects who had a history of infrequent use.
Id.
The EMIT d.a.u. (drugs of abuse in urine) test is a larger system designed for higher
volume laboratories. It is capable of detecting concentrations of 50 ng/ml at a 95%
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specific immunoassays can discriminate only between the presence
or absence of the expected drug or drugs. They are at best semi-
quantitative, that is, able to yield only an estimate of the quantity of
a drug in an individual's system.39
Moreover, some cannabinoid assay tests may be too sensitive
for employee testing since they can react positively to a sample from
a person who has been passively exposed to marijuana smoke, par-
ticularly when results are reported at low cut-off levels such as 20
nanograms/millihter.4 Thus, it is important that the sensitivity of
the initial screening test be regulated. For example, use of a 100
nanogram/milliliter cut-off value in an EMIT test provides reason-
able sensitivity that is unlikely to result in reporting of false positive
results.:" A negative finding in such a test sample is strong evidence
that THC is not present in the system of the tested individual in
excess of the detection limit. At the 100 nanogram/milliliter cut-
off, most marijuana use at low to moderate levels will be undetect-
able beyond 24-72 hours, although chronic use may be detected for
a longer period.42 Use of this higher cut-off value, then, increases
the job-relatedness of the test.
It should be recognized that the test cannot measure the degree
of employee impairment directly. Indeed, little is known about the
length of time impairment persists after marijuana use. But one
preliminary Stanford University study of experienced aircraft pilots
indicates that seriously impairing effects of a single marijuana ciga-
rette persist for at least twenty-four hours.43 The study documented
that pilots under the influence of marijuana committed serious er-
rors on calibrated flight simulators. The impairment persisted long
after the individuals in the study ceased to have a subjective sense of
intoxication." The authors concluded that marijuana's persistent
impairing effects can lead to serious errors, this, at least for complex
behavioral and cognitive tasks such as that involved in operating
probability level. A newer formulation of the d.a.u. system uses a 100 ng/ml cut-off to de-
crease the possibility of a positive finding due to passive exposure to marijuana smoke. Id.
39. Allen, supra note 20, at 4.
40. Sedgewick, supra note 16, at 5.
41. Schwartz, Hayden & Riddile, supra note 4.
42. See supra note 37; Sedgewick, supra note 16, at 6.
43. Yesavage, Leirer, Denari & Hollister, Carry-Over Effects of Marjuana Intoxication
on Aircraft Pilot Performance: A Preliminary Report, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY, Nov., 1985, at
1325. The marijuana cigarettes contained 19 milligrams of THC, the equivalent of a strong
social dose. Id. at 1326. The authors documented errors of the kind that may have had
disasterous consequences had they taken place in a real aircraft.
44. Id.
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aircraft.
Although these findings clearly indicate the need for further
research on the effects of marijuana in the workplace, they do sug-
gest that employee testing that detects recent off-hours marijuana
use cannot be considered presumptively non-job-related since the
effects of use may persist into work hours. It is possible that the
effects of moderate to heavy marijuana use may persist for a longer
period than the twenty-four hour period that was measured in the
Stanford University study, which involved test subjects who
smoked only a single marijuana cigarette.
Most other abused drugs have much shorter detection periods
in urine than does marijuana.46 These laboratory detection periods
are sufficiently brief to be considered strongly job-related, Since ob-
jective drug tests supplement or supplant far less accurate subjective
impressions of possible employee drug use, employers should not be
faulted so long as detection limits of these objective tests bear a ra-
tional relationship to the persistence of impairment.
c. Gas Chromatograph/Mass Spectrometer Tests
Gas chromatograph/mass spectrometers (GC/MS) are fast be-
coming the most accepted means of verifying initial positive find-
ings of drug use,47 although a battery of other instruments may be
substituted in special situations. GC/MS devices are widely used in
forensic, pharmaceutical, clinical and industrial service laboratories
and provide state-of-the-art accuracy.48
The principle behind gas chromatography is similar to that of
TLC, except that GC/MS equipment is capable of performing sev-
eral different kinds of chemical analyses on vaporized samples.49
Liquid chromatography also can be used for samples not suitable
for vaporization.
Gas chromatographs are typically fitted with one or more de-
tectors that identify various chemical properties by means of ther-
mal conductivity, flame ionization, electron capture or nitrogen/
phosphorus analysis.50 When one of the detectors is a mass spec-
trometer or a mass selective detector the characteristic mass spectra
45. Id. at 1338.
46. SMITH & WESSON, supra note 1, at 15.
47. SMITH & WESSON, supra note 1, at 14 ("Gas chromatography with a mass spec-
trometry detector (GC/IMS) is the most sensitive and specific test procedure commonly used
for drug identification and is used primarily for confirmatory testing").
48. Allen, supra note 20, at 3.
49. SMITH & WESSON, supra note 1, at 17.
50. See Terms of Substance, 13 PHARMCHEM NEWSLETTER, No. 4, July-Aug., 1984.
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of the ions of the compounds under examination can be directly
monitored and recorded."' Computerized data bases can then be
searched to find a positive spectral match. 2
C. Current Legal and Practical Restraints on the Use of
Drug and Alcohol Testing
The dominant legal concern for employers who wish to imple-
ment a drug or alcohol testing program is the possibility that the
program may invade an employee's privacy.53 To date, however, no
court has made a significant attempt to articulate the nature of the
employee privacy interest that is at stake when an employer re-
quests employees to undergo such testing.54 Nor has any court ex-
pressly balanced employee privacy rights against the array of
societal, employer and co-worker interests that are advanced by
drug or alcohol testing. At this point, employers are left to guess at
how courts might handle drug testing issues based upon a handful
of decisions, many involving only analogous privacy interests.
Federal law and the laws of many states provide some form of
privacy right. Although the United States Constitution does not ex-
pressly provide a right of privacy, the Supreme Court has held that
the Bill of Rights implicitly guarantees such a right.5 The Califor-
nia Constitution, on the other hand, expressly provides two in-
dependent bases for an individual's right to privacy.5 6  Under
Article I, section 17, an individual has a general right of privacy
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. As a legal issue, privacy is exceedingly difficult to define. See generally Tomkovicz,
Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment'v
Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645 (1985). Professor Tomkovicz argues persuasively
that the courts have not been at all successful in formulating a coherent approach to the
privacy concept.
54. Most court decisions concerning privacy have arisen in the criminal context,
although a few recent civil cases have involved drug investigations by public employers.
None of these eases provide definitive answers for private sector employers, but collectively
they offer some guidelines. See infra notes 59-101 and accompanying text.
55. See, eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Bowers v. Hardwick, 54 U.S.L.W. 4919 (U.S. June 30, 1986) (No. 85-140)..
56. In addition to California, at least six other states provide constitutional privacy
guarantees: Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Massachusetts, Montana and Rhode Island. In states
that lack statutory or constitutional privacy protection, courts may fashion protection as a
matter of common law by expanding various tort theories now developing in the employment
field.
57. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 1, provides: "All people are by nature free and independent,
and have certain inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness,
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and Article I, section 1358 protects individuals against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
These two bases of liability for violations of privacy rights are
discussed in general below, followed by more specific comments
about their application to drug and alcohol testing. The discussion
is concluded with practical advice.
1. Drug and Alcohol Testing: An Employee's General
Right to Privacy
No California courts have thoroughly addressed the question
of whether constitutionally protected employee privacy interests are
infringed upon by employer investigations into drug use.59 There-
fore, no court has had the corresponding opportunity to enunciate
and privacy." (Emphasis added.) The specific guarantee of a right to privacy was added to
Article I of the California Constitution by constitutional initiative in 1971.
58. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13. This section contains language almost identical to that of
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. As with the fourth amendment,
cases under this section usually involve the question of whether evidence is admissible in a
criminal trial. However, it also provides a basis for civil liability for unreasonable searches.
For a discussion of the origin of such rights, see 24 Op. ATry. GEN. 95 (Cal. 1954). Califor-
nia courts have recently abandoned a long line of divergent criminal search and seizure cases
in the aftermath of the enactment by the voters of a constitutional initiative that requires
California criminal search and seizure standards to conform to federal law. In Re Lance W.,
37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985). In effect, the amendment required
that state court criminal proceedings be governed by federal constitutional standards for the
exclusion of evidence. See People v. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d 251, 667 P.2d 149, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692
(1983) (Proposition 8 held inapplicable to prosecutions for crimes committed before its effec-
tive date). The effect of the California constitutional change is to overrule a decade or more
of "respectful consideration" of U.S. Supreme Court standards, while the California courts
vigorously pursued their own independent agenda in the criminal search and seizure area.
See People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951, n.4, 538 P.2d 753, n.4, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302,
n.4 (1975).
By contrast, there is no constitutional restriction that limits the California courts with
respect to civil suits that are brought under a constitutional privacy theory. As a result, civil
suits brought under article I, section 1, of the California constitution are not controlled by
either state or federal search and seizure rulings. Nor do federal constitutional privacy devel-
opments necessarily govern state civil privacy cases brought under article I, section 1. See,
e.g., People v. Cook, 41 Cal3d 373, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499; (1985); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175 Cal.
App. 3d 1028, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1985), rev. granted, - Cal.3d -, 715 P.2d 680, 224 Cal.
Rptr. 719 (April 3, 1986); CAL. CONsT., art. I, § 28(d).
59. One pending California case may determine whether an employer may, pursuant to
an established policy, terminate an employee for refusing to submit a urine sample for drug
testing. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., No. 843230 (S.F. Super. Ct.). The complaint
alleges, inter alia, a constitutional privacy violation even though the plaintiff refused to be
tested and never was tested. Thus it is improbable that a court could find an actual privacy
invasion. Instead, the case may be more akin to a wrongful discharge proceeding. See
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1979)
(employee termination for refusal to perform illegal act violates public policy). The essence
of such an alternative claim would be that a termination for refusing to undergo drug testing
violates public policy because continued employment was conditioned upon undergoing what
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whether and to what degree an employer's interest or public policy
factors counteracts individual employee privacy concerns. To gain
insight into the possible outcome of future drug test privacy cases,
then, it is necessary to explore the basic elements of the constitu-
tional privacy interest. These basic tenets can be applied to the spe-
cific concern created by such testing.
a. The Constitutional Right to Privacy
The leading California case interpreting this general privacy
right is White v. Davis.6 0 In White the California Supreme Court
stated that the California right to privacy operates to prevent gov-
ernment and business interests from secret gathering of personal in-
formation, form overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary
personal information and from improper use or disclosure of per-
sonal information properly gathered. The White Court set forth
these prohibitions in a list of "mischiefs" that the right to privacy
was intended to correct.6 '
The court cautioned that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy, but stated that any such incur-
sion must be justified by a "compelling interest."' 62 The court also
made clear that the constitutional provision creates a civil right to
privacy enforceable by an individual.6 3
might have been an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. Such an argument depends upon
bootstrapping, and should fail, at least conceptually.
60. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d. 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
61. These "mischiefs" are : (a) "Government snooping" and the secret gathering of
personal information; (b) The overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal
information by government and business interests; (c) The improper use of information prop-
erly obtained for a specific purpose, for example, the use of it for another purpose or the
disclosure of it to some third party; and (d) The lack of a reasonable check on the accuracy of
existing records. Id. at 775. The "mischiefs" were not derived from any searching analysis of
the concept of privacy, but rather by adopting statements of purpose drafted by the propo-
nents of the iniative measure for the election campaign.
62. Id.
63. See also Porten v. Univ. of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829, 134 Cal. Rptr.
839, 843 (1976), quoted with approval, Jones v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 550,
174 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1981) (stating that the elevation of the right to be free from invasions of
privacy to constitutional stature was apparently intended to be an expansion of the privacy
right); see generally, California Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Development of the Pro-
tection of Private Lif, 9 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 385 (1982).
Employers should be aware that in certain circumstances the privacy rights of their
employees may conflict with the privacy rights of other individuals. For example, in Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 160 (1981), a university professor made demand upon the university for his own per-
sonnel, tenure and promotion files. Included in the files were letters of reference and peer
evaluations that were covered by an explicit policy guaranteeing confidentiality to the writers.
When the University refused to turn over the evaluations, the plaintiff brought a motion
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b. The Right to Privacy Applied to Drug and
Alcohol Testing
Applying the White "mischiefs" to employee drug testing
yields no clear guidance.64 The White decision focuses on secret or
overbroad information gathering and improper disclosure of sub-
jects that do not correspond closely to any privacy interest impli-
cated by drug testing. On the other hand, California privacy
decisions subsequent to White have clarified that the right to pri-
vacy is not absolute; it must be balanced against other competing
interests.65
With respect to the use of illegal drugs, at least one California
Court has held that an individual has no constitutional privacy
right in the use or possession of cocaine at home.66 Similarly, there
is no California constitutional right to use or possess marijuana,
even in one's own home.67 It follows that in the far more public
workplace, no per se constitutional protection exists for use or pos-
session of illegal drugs. Thus, employers can be expected to have
considerable freedom to test identified or strongly suspected drug
users. But not all employees are drug users and not all testing is
triggered by obviously exhibited manifestations of drug use. Courts
must now begin to address whether employers may require testing
because of generally perceived drug use problems in the particular
workplace or whether such programs may be adopted in light of
statistics indicating that worker drug use is prevalent in society or
in a particular industry.
Courts also must balance the relative importance of the articu-
lated interests of the employer, co-employees and society against
those of the employee being asked to participate in a testing pro-
gram.68 The typical employer interests in drug or alcohol testing
to compel production of the documents. In ruling on the motion, the court noted that there
were conflicting rights of privacy: the plaintiff's right to view his own personnel files and the
privacy rights of the writers of the evaluations. The court emphasized that the University
had an obligation to guard the rights of both. In this instance, the court resolved the conflict
by ordering the University to produce the content of the documents after the relevant identi-
ties had been deleted.
64. Employee drug testing programs that operate without disclosing that samples will
be tested for drug content might conceivably fall within the White prohibitions. Also, testing
that unnecessarily focuses on off-duty conduct may be more susceptible to a privacy challenge
than testing that is tailored to the extent practicable to reflect drug use that could affect work
performance.
65. See infra note 68.
66. People v. Davis, 92 Cal. App. 3d 250, 260-61, 154 Cal. Rptr. 817, 823 (1979).
67. Nat'l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Gain, 100 Cal. App. 3d 586, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 181 (1979). But see Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alas. 1975).
68. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. Courts have traditionally applied a
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include: (1) decreasing costs associated with lost productivity and
stolen or damaged property; (2) increasing employee health and re-
habilitation; and (3) improving safety and reducing dangers to other
workers and the public.69
An employee's interest centers on generalized notions that
forced participation in a drug testing program violates a right to be
free from indignities and bodily intrusions. The most prevalent ar-
guments focus on an employee's right 1) to freedom from workplace
intrusions during off hours; and 2) to maintain lifestyle privacy, in-
cluding what he or she has ingested or otherwise absorbed.70
The concern that an employer's drug or alcohol testing pro-
gram may infringe on off-duty activity is a serious one. Such tests
certainly can identify drug use that took place during an employee's
off duty hours. Most courts will recognize that an employer has a
substantially lessened interest in an employee's personal matters or
off-hours behavior, unless it can be shown that an employee's acts
(including drug usage) in some way affect the workplace.7
balancing test by determining the importance of the privacy interest and weighing it against
the intrusion. See Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Superior Court, 119
Cal. App. 3d 516, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1981) (balancing test used for conflicting rights of
privacy and further balancing required to reconcile the privacy right with the "strong public
policy in favor of discovery in civil litigation"); Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 574
P.2d 766, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978) (balancing state interest in facilitating the ascertainment
of truth in connection with legal proceedings against the right of privacy that inheres in
private associational affiliations and activities).
69. See Lehr & Middlebrooks, Work-Place Privacy Issues and Screening Policies, 11
EMP. REL. L.J. 407 (1985). The authors list several factors that are cited by employers for
instituting drug screening policies and thereby "risking conflict with employee dignity inter-
ests." Among the factors are increased health costs, absenteeism, work-related accidents and
discipline that are associated with drug use. An additional justification for drug testing pro-
grams includes the employer's attempt to reduce the risk of lawsuits for negligent hiring or
supervision of drug or alcohol impaired employees. Another motivating factor is the need to
reduce security risks from theft of company property, theft and disclosure of company confi-
dential information and trade secrets. Id. at 407-08 (citations omitted).
70. See Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985) (the
court brushed aside the element of invasiveness as minimal for urine testing since it involves
only normal bodily function); but cf. Local 1900, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Potomac
Elec. Power Co., No. CA 86-717 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 1986), 55 DAILY LAB. REP'T D-1 (Mar.
21 1986) (BNA) (granting TRO to stop employer from implementing new testing policy be-
cause "pending arbitration, employees must undergo invasions of privacy which are almost
unheard of in a free society or they will be summarily fired."), motion forpreliminary injunc-
tion denied, 634 F. Supp 642 (D.D.C. 1986) (dispute held to be arbitrable since integrity of
arbitration process not threatened).
71. See, eg., Rulon-Miller v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208
Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984). In Rulon-Miller, the appellate court upheld a jury award of $300,000
in compensatory and punitive damages for an employer's actions in removing an employee
from a sales manager position based on the employee's romantic involvement with an em-
ployee of a competitor company. The jury and the reviewing court rejected the employer's
argument that the employee's personal romantic life was impinging on her ability to ade-
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Nevertheless, the employee with residual traces of drugs in his
or her system during working hours may be in violation of the em-
ployer's anti-drug rules, particularly if the rules require that em-
ployees be drug free at all times. And even if the employee is not
"impaired" at the time of testing, there is a reasonable probability
that he or she will be impaired at some future time, based upon test
results that indicate very recent past use. Indeed, the propensity of
employees to use drugs may itself be a form of impairment or haz-
ard that an employer is entitled to address. Thus, the private use of
drugs away from work would appear to be a much weaker privacy
interest than other personal matters that do not concern the
workplace.
The same conclusion can be reached by analyzing workplace
testing for alcohol. Alcohol use or intoxication at work is prohib-
ited by most employer policies, while its use is legal and its off-the-
job use is typically permitted. The common tests for alcohol use
have very short detection limits and the correlation between the re-
sults of laboratory urine tests and actual blood alcohol concentra-
tions is reasonably well understood.72 Thus, the tests are minimally
intrusive on off-hours use. Further, tests revealing the presence of
alcohol in an individual's system are susceptible to reliable interpre-
tation. A very low level may be consistent with off-hours use and
might lead to no disciplinary measures.
quately perform her job. The court noted that the employer had a written policy insuring
employees that the company would not inquire into or interfere with personal activities not
related to work. The court's analysis of the privacy issue was minimal, but it appears possible
under the bare rationale of Rulon-Miller that an employer may have to justify drug testing or
inquiries into the private drug usage of an employee. See also Thorne v. El Segundo, 726
F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983) (off-duty sexual conduct protected by privacy interest); Fults v.
Superior Court, 88 Cal. App. 3d 899, 152 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1979) (in a paternity suit, plaintiff
did not have to disclose names of all persons with whom she had been romantically involved;
it was sufficient that she stated that she had had no sexual relations with any person other
than defendant during six month period surrounding likely date of conception); Morales v.
Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 283, 160 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1979).
The Alaska Supreme Court has observed that the right of privacy:
must yield when it interferes in a serious manner with the health, safety, rights
and privileges of others or with the public welfare. No one has an absolute
right to do things in the privacy of his own home which will affect himself or
others adversely. Indeed one aspect of a private matter is that it is private, that
is that it does not affect persons beyond the actor, and hence is none of their
business. When a matter does affect the public, directly or indirectly, it loses
its wholly private character, and can be made to yield when an appropriate
public need is demonstrated.
Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alas. 1975) (holding that Alaska constitution affords pro-
tection for private, noncommercial use of marijuana in home).
72. These limits generally do not exceed several hours. SMITH & WESSON, supra, note
1, at 15. See Williams, Peat, Crouch, Wells & Finkle, supra note 4, at 19.
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The related concern for the privacy of an employee's lifestyle
raised by drug testing is caused, perhaps paradoxically, by the very
accuracy or the perceived accuracy of these tests. An employee
might explain away an observational finding (e.g., unsteady gait or
dilated pupils). But when a test affords the laboratory technician a
full spectral display uniquely identifying the drugs in one's urine or
identifying the characteristic mass ions of each drug compound or
both (as GC/MS tests do), there is little or no room for argument."
Employees may well analogize the privacy intrusion posed by
drug testing to the intrusion caused by wiretapping or eavesdrop-
ping. In Ribas v. Clark,74 a California court discussed the different
levels of intrusion one experiences when a confidant repeats a pri-
vate conversation to a third party. If only the second hand recollec-
tion is repeated to third parties, the sense of betrayal experienced is
at least tempered by the "privilege" of denying the accuracy, con-
text or even the fact of utterance of the repeated remark. But when
one later learns that the remark was secretly tape recorded or sur-
reptitiously overheard by other persons, the privilege is lost. As the
Ribas court observed: ". . . such secret monitoring denies the
speaker an important aspect of privacy of communication - the
right to control the nature and extent of the first hand dissemination
of his statements.,
75
The exactitude of drug test results, like the exactitude of
one's tape recorded words, affords an employee only a few avenues
of argument or cavil regarding the fact of drug ingestion. Certainly
a reported positive test result creates a presumption of drug use that
can be overcome only when the employee can effectively challenge
or explain the test results. Moreover, the intrusion, like eavesdrop-
ping, may occur without a trespass or a particularly invasive act,
76
73. See McBay, Problems in Testing for Abused Drugs, J. A.M.A., January 3, 1986, at
39-40 (letter to editor); Smith & Wesson, have described GC/MS analysis as follows:
The sample is first separated into components by gas chromatography and
the mass spectrometer is used to identify the substances emerging from the gas
chromatograph. The mass spectrometer subjects the compounds to an electron
beam that breaks them into fragments and accelerates them through a mag-
netic field. Because a molecule of a drug always breaks into the same frag-
ments, which is known as its mass spectrum, the mass spectrum is like a
fingerprint that is compared to known compounds. The mass spectrum is
unique for each drug and, therefore, the detection by GC/MS is highly specific.
SMITH & WEssoN, supra note 1, at 14.
74. 38 Cal.3d 355, 212 Cal. Rptr. 143, 696 P.2d 637 (1985).
75. Id. at 361, citing Comment, Electronic Surveillance in California: A Study in State
Legislative Control, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1182, 1232 (1969); Warden v. Kahn 99 Cal. App. 3d
805, 160 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1979).
76. Testing performed with urine samples requires no physical invasion. As one court
[V:ol. 2324
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although like eavesdropping, the amount of personal information
that can be gleaned from drug testing might be found to intrude
upon some personal secrecy or dignity interest. 7 One commentator
has referred to this interest as the "privacy of sanctuary," which
"means prohibiting other persons from seeing, hearing, and
knowing. "78
In sum, the concern over the intrusiveness of drug testing
draws its legitimacy from the intrusion, however slight on this per-
sonal secrecy or dignity interest. In what circumstances courts will
recognize this concern as the foundation for a valid legal theory is
still unclear. The answer may lie in testing this privacy concern
against analogous criminal search and seizure standards, which are
discussed below.
put it, urine testing requires only a "normal body function." Turner v. Fraternal Order of
Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985). The U.S. Supreme Court has previously ruled
that blood tests, which require an extraction of blood samples for testing, constitute a search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767
(1965). The court did not regard blood tests as particularly invasive, however. In permitting
warrantless blood tests to be performed as an incident to an arrest for driving while intoxi-
cated the court stated:
Such tests are a commonplace [sic] in these days of periodic physical ex-
aminations and experience with them teaches that the quantity of blood ex-
tracted is minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves virtually
no risk, trauma or pain.
Id. at 771. The court quoted with approval the following passage from Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432 (1957):
The blood test procedure has become routine in our everyday life. It is a
ritual for those going into military service as well as those applying for mar-
riage licenses. Many colleges require such tests before permitting entrance and
literally millions of us have voluntarily gone through the same, though a
longer, routine in becoming blood donors.
Id. at 771, n.13 (quoting 352 U.S. at 436). Thus, if the invasiveness of blood tests did not
particularly alarm the court, certainly urine tests, which require no body invasion, cannot be
considered invasive. The only privacy concern over urine tests is the personal intrusion they
may cause, a matter expressly not addressed in Schmerber since the arrestee refused a non-
invasive breathalyzer test. Id. at 771.
77. See, eg., Porten v. Univ. of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1976) (defendant University violated plaintiffs right to privacy when it sent a copy of his
transcript to the State Scholarship Loan Commission without his authorization and contrary
to its assurances of confidentiality); Payton v. Santa Clara, 132 Cal. App. 3d 152, 154-155,
183 Cal. Rptr. 17, 17-18 (1982) (prima facie violation of right to privacy where memorandum
outlining grounds for termination of employment was improperly posted in common work
area); H & M Assoc. v. El Centro, 109 Cal. App. 3d 399, 411, 167 Cal. Rptr. 392, 400 (1980)
(complaint stated cause of action where information obtained by employer for accounting
purposes was divulged to lending institutions).
78. Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64
CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1976) (noting that this sanctuary is expressed in its most concrete and
traditional form in the fourth amendment and also includes "intangible matters such as sight,
smells and information.")
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2. Drug and Alcohol Testing: An Employee's Right to
be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Federal and state constitutions protect all citizens from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures of person and property.79 In general,
however, the federal protection applies only when the challenged
action is taken by government officials, i.e. when "state action" is
present."0 Indeed, private employers often use the state action re-
quirement as a defense to constitutional challenges of their drug
policies."1 On the other hand, a private employer may be held to a
constitutional standard when police or other government officials
are involved in the search and the employer can be said to act as the
"agent" of the state.8 2 Moreover, an individual state's constitution
or tort law may explicitly or implicitly apply search and seizure
doctrine more broadly to include purely private actions.8 3 Thus,
79. See generally U.S. CONSr., amend. IV; CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13. California search
and seizure prohibitions are coextensive with those guaranteed under the Fourth amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. See People v. Lissauer, 169 Cal. App. 3d 413, 215 Cal. Rptr. 335
(1985). See supra note 58.
80. See generally New Jersey v. TLO., 105 S.Ct. 733 (1985) (Fourth amendment con-
trols searches by school authorities); Rendell-Baher v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
81. See, eg., Stevens v. Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabian Consortium, 576 F. Supp,
516 (D. Md. 1983).
82. See, eg., Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D. N.J. 1985). See also Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 447 (1971);
United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982) (search held not subject to Fourth
amendment where police acquiesced in search of premises by private citizen and accompa-
nied the citizen to the premises for protective purposes but did not encourage the search or
plant the idea of the search; the critical factors in the instrument or agent analysis are: (1)
whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the private conduct and (2) whether the
party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or further his own
ends); United States v. McGreevy, 652 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1981) (private citizen acting at
direction or encouragement of government officials); United States v. Gumerlock, 590 F.2d
794 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, sub nom, Fannon v. United States, 441 U.S. 948 (1979)
(Fourth amendment not implicated in search by private citizen motivated by unilateral desire
to aid in enforcement of law where government neither participated in nor encouraged the
search); U.S. v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).
83. See generally 24 Op. Arr'Y GEN. 95 (Cal. 1954). See also Utility Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, Local 246 v. So. California Edison Co., L.A. Super. Ct., No. CA000888
(filed Sept. 28, 1984) (utility employees' challenge to random drug searches by relying on Gay
Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979), which
held equal protection clause of the California Constitution prohibits public utility from dis-
criminating against homosexual employees). Additionally, warrantless government searches,
where they are found permissible, would seem to set a minimum standard that could be
applied to random or unannounced employer searches. Arguably, if the government can
lawfully intrude, the employer should have available an analogous justification for searches
on employer premises, even absent any form of employee consent. Employers may have
greater freedom to act than does the government. But presumably employers have no less
freedom, particularly on their own premises.
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employers should be familiar with and prepared to follow constitu-
tional standards.
a. General Search and Seizure Concerns
Whether a search is unreasonable under the fourth amendment
depends on whether the area searched is one in which there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy.84 Under general fourth amend-
ment standards, the employee privacy interest in avoiding drug tests
would appear relatively weak. First, a preannounced workplace
drug testing policy that is clearly communicated to employees
should remove any objective expectation of privacy among employ-
ees as to testing conducted pursuant to the policy." Second, in
most businesses employees are exposed to the public at large or at
least to other employees, which correspondingly lessens the employ-
ees' privacy interest.86
Third, the degree of intrusion of reasonably conducted tests
should not violate constitutional search and seizure standards.
87
Drug testing requires the employee to provide a urine specimen.
Production of the sample itself may offend some individuals, partic-
ularly if witnessed by a technician or some other person. On the
other hand, the informational content of the test itself is highly spe-
cific, much like the olfactory information gathered by drug-sniffing
dogs used to detect contraband in luggage at airports. Such use of
dogs has been held not to constitute a search under fourth amend-
84. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364
(1968); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Each individual's privacy interest
is shaped by the context in which it is asserted. United States v. Thomas, 729 F.2d 120, 123-
24 (2d Cir. 1984).
85. Such an employer policy may possess some of the attributes of administrative in-
spections. For example, warrantless searches by police involving drivers stopped at sobriety
checkpoints have been analyzed under the standards applied to administrative searches. See
Ingersoll v. Palmer, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1028, 221 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1985), rev. granted, _ Cal.
3d. , 715 P.2d 680, 224 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Cal., April 3, 1986) (police inspection guidelines
involving advance notice, minimal intrusion, restrictions on discretion of field officers to-
gether with time and place restrictions found to be reasonable under both fourth amendment
and California Constitution); but cf. State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977 (N.H. 1985) (checkpoint
unconstitutional under New Hampshire Constitution).
86. See, eg., United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (knowing and public exposures
may forfeit constitutional protection); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (exposure
of automobile on "public thoroughfare" leads to holding that "bumper beeper" surveillance
was not a "search"); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (1983) (canine
sniffing of luggage at airport held not a search).
87. See, eg., id.; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1662 n.24
(1984) (since canine intrusion could gather only limited information regarding presence of
drugs, there was less risk of an intrusion on legitimate privacy interests).
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ment standards. 8 Moreover, to some individuals the intrusion
from obtaining the urine sample may be less offensive than subjec-
tive testing requiring him or her to walk a line, touch the nose, re-
cite the alphabet or perform other tasks that may indicate
intoxication.
Finally, some fourth amendment cases have indicated that the
need for law enforcement may be considered when weighing the
reasonableness of any search.8 9 If this factor is analogized to the
workplace, drug testing should be more likely to be held constitu-
tional because use of objective, analytical methods is more effective
and accurate than other subjective forms of employee monitoring
and testing. Moreover, if the drug tests are properly performed, the
chances are lessened that a mistaken adverse action will be taken
against an employee. 90
b. Drug Testing: Search and Seizure Case Law
The early cases in which courts have addressed employer drug
testing policies in the fourth amendment context generally indicate
that some forms of testing are lawful, even when ordered by the
government. The rationale supporting these judgments is not uni-
form, however. In Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police,91 the plain-
tiff argued that requiring members of the police force to undergo
warrantless urine drug testing constituted an unreasonable search
and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. Police regulation
provided that a "confirmed finding of an illicit narcotic or con-
trolled substance," or refusal by any individual to undergo testing
would result in a proposal for termination. The rule also permitted
the Police to compel testing in the event of "suspected drug use" or
"at the discretion" of the Board of Police and Fire Surgeons. 92 The
88. Id.
89. See, eg., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502
(1983); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981). The Terry court effectively indi-
cated that there was some fundamental baseline where societal needs for preventing and de-
tecting crime justify a "stop and frisk" search, even without probable cause.
90. Professor Tomkovicz has advocated a Fourth amendment "legitimate privacy
needs" analysis to supplant the traditional fourth amendment analysis. Tomkovicz, supra
note 53, at 700. Under this analysis the critical factor in privacy analysis becomes whether
individuals in the claimant's situation have legitimate needs for privacy having a "basis in the
laws, principles, traditions, or customs of the American social order .... Id. The basic issue
becomes whether societal values and interests are promoted by a guaranteed secrecy medium.
Id. at 701. Even under this basic privacy analysis, an employee's legitimate need for privacy
would appear to be relatively low, given the important societal benefits gained from prevent-
ing and deterring drug and alcohol use and abuse.
91. 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985).
92. Id. at 1007.
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plaintiff employee challenged the regulation because it provided no
clear guideline for when testing could be ordered.
Citing current widespread drug use in all segments of the pop-
ulation, the court held that the Department was justified in promul-
gating the rule in an effort to prevent the illicit use of narcotics by
members of the police force.93 The court qualified the "suspected
drug use" standard by requiring a "reasonable, objective basis for
medical investigation through urinalysis." 94 Additionally, it con-
cluded that urinalysis was not an extreme body invasion. Since the
test required only "a normal bodily function" for the purpose of
testing, it was not an unreasonable search or seizure.95
A federal court has applied the federal constitutional right of
privacy and the federal search and seizure standards to testing of
thoroughbred race horse jockeys by state race officials. In Shoe-
maker v. Handel,96 the racetrack procedures required all jockeys to
take a daily breathalyzer test and three to five jockeys to take a
urinalysis test. The jockeys were selected for the urinalysis by ran-
dom name drawing system, which allowed each jockey an equal
chance of being selected to give a sample on a particular evening.
In addition, the policy provided confidentiality protections to guard
against unauthorized disclosure of findings.
The court held that jockeys did not have a sufficient expecta-
tion of privacy in the regulated horse racing industry to preclude
warrantless daily breathalyzer tests to detect alcohol use or "ran-
dom" urinalysis to detect controlled substances. In the court's
view, the procedural safeguards in the administration of the tests
obviated the need for individualized suspicion of drug use for trig-
gering the test.97 The court distinguished the race-track's random
selection method from arbitrary methods that might otherwise be
used for indiscriminate testing.98
This decision is helpful to employers since it sets forth at least
one apparently permissible policy that may be effectively used in
employee drug screening programs. The rationale of Shoemaker
comfortably supports a non-arbitrary random screening program
combined with some form of "for cause" testing. It is too early to
93. Id. at 1008.
94. Id. at 1009.
95. Id.
96. 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.C. N.J. 1985), aff'd, No. 85-5655 (3d Cir. July 10, 1986)
(available July 25, 1986, on WESTLAW, Allfeds library) (search upheld as valid administra-
tive search).
97. Id. at 1103, 1105-07.
98. Id.
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tell, however, whether other courts will endorse this approach or
will limit the holding to the highly regulated racetrack industry.99
The problem of suspected drug use and concomitant safety
concerns also arose in Div. 241 Amalgamated Transit Union (AFL-
CIO) v. Suscy.""° In Suscy, a transit authority required that em-
ployees be tested for drugs and alcohol following "any serious acci-
dent" or if the employee was "suspected of being under the
influence" of intoxicating liquor or narcotics. 101 The court held
that blood and urine testing of municipal bus drivers was facially
permissible under the fourth amendment, citing the valid public in-
terest in protecting the public. This decision reinforces the notion
that employers should be able to test employees if public safety is an
overriding concern. In addition, it suggests that testing is appropri-
ate after accidents when drug usage may have been a factor.
3. Privacy Rights and Employee Testing: Practical
Advice
Obviously, there are precious few court decisions determining
the legal consequences of drug and alcohol testing programs in the
workplace. Nonetheless, a number of general principles emerge
from analogous case law and common sense.
a. Choosing the Test Method
Automated laboratory equipment can handle up to 99 samples,
taking only a few minutes to analyze each sample. However, such
equipment is still very expensive. Moreover, the best equipment
and methods are only as reliable as the laboratory itself."' 2 The
quality and reliability of the results depend upon the rigor of the
99. Cf. McDonell v. Hunter, 746 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1985) (upholding as not an abuse of
discretion grant of preliminary injunction by district court barring strip searches, blood tests
and urinalysis tests of prison guards absent a showing of probable cause); Palm Bay v.
Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. App. 1985) (affirming lower court grant of injunction that
forbade random testing of police officers and firefighters absent a showing of probable cause,
but permitting testing during periodic regularly scheduled physical examinations).
100. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976).
101. Id. at 1267. The individual plaintiff who was tested had been selected because two
supervisory employees believed he was under the influence. See also Burka v. New York City
Transit Auth., No. 85 Civ. 5751 (GLG) (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1986) (available on WESTLAW
July 25, 1986, Allfeds library) (motion for class certification denied without prejudice in case
challenging drug test policy of transit authority).
102. Hanson, Caudill & Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing, Results of CDC Blind Study, 3.
A.M.A., April 26, 1985, at 2382. This study, conducted at intervals between 1972-1981,
evaluated 13 laboratories serving government-sponsored methadone treatment facilities for
their proficiency in accurately testing drug samples. The laboratories were not necessarily
ones that also performed employee testing, which was quite rare when data were collected for
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laboratory procedures and the skill of the chemists, toxicologists
and other personnel who handle and analyze the samples.1"3
Given a reliable laboratory, modem analytical techniques can
provide almost unerring exactitude in drug identification and quan-
titation. A modem commercial laboratory today can promise accu-
rate test results better than 99% of the time, although errors such as
mishandling of samples and other gaps in the "chain of custody" of
samples can affect the overall accuracy." ° Employers should insist
that laboratories confirm the results of a positive finding by a sec-
ond test, preferably using a different analytical method.'0 5 This rule
is particularly important with TLC testing, but is routine practice
for immunoassay testing as well.
Employers should pay particular attention when interpreting
test results indicating marijuana use. THC metabolites do not im-
mediately appear in urine specimens and they may persist for days
or weeks, depending upon the sensitivity of the test and the use pat-
tern of the individual. Hence, it is not possible to distinguish a re-
this study. The results of the study reflected serious shortcomings of those laboratories' prac-
tices. Alarmingly high error rates were found during the period covered by the study.
It must be noted, however, that this study was conducted without reference to the cost
or methodology of the procedures used by the laboratories. For example, there is no indica-
tion that any of the laboratories performed any confirmatory tests on the samples. The au-
thors of the study attributed the fact that false negatives (samples contained drugs but
laboratory did not identify them) were high, while false positives (samples did not contain
drugs, but laboratory reported that they did) were low primarily to the use by the laboratories
of less sensitive testing which may have resulted from methodological design, personnel
problems or the government reimbursement process. The study's authors noted as a potential
cause of the laboratory errors the government practice of awarding contracts to the lowest
bidder (leading to inadequate reimbursement) without assessment of testing quality. The au-
thors also suggested that current fee schedules for government sponsored testing are unrealis-
tic.
The study did not examine private sector employee testing. The study should in no way
be interpreted as a general indictment of the current quality of commercial testing laborato-
ries using generally accepted screening methods in conjunction with confirmatory testing of
positive samples. At least two recent articles and one piece of pending legislation in Califor-
nia have already mistakenly applied this data and inapposite study results to employee test-
ing. See Rothstein, Screening Workers for Drugs: A Legal and Ethical Framework, 11 EMPL.
REL. L.L 422, 426-27 (1985); Bishop, Drug Testing Comes To Work, 6 CAL. LAW., April,
1986, 28, 30; A.B. 4242 (Klehs) supra note 12 (preamble); See infra Appendix C. The inap-
plicability of the study to employee testing should not obscure the main value of the study
which is to document the potential effectiveness of blind testing for controlling laboratory
quality.
103. Allen, supra note 20, at 3.
104. Id. at 2. The "chain of custody" refers to the documentation that is performed for
each sample to ensure that the identity of each sample donor can be matched to the correct
sample. Commonly, each individual who handles the sample is required to record a notation
on a label that is attached to or accompanies the sample.
105. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. See also Sedgewick, supra note 16, at 5.
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cent casual user from a heavy user who may have last ingested
marijuana several days before.'" 6
b. Applying a Test Policy
In general, drug testing should be only as extensive as is rea-
sonably justified by the specific employer's legitimate need for
safety, security and employee productivity. If "for cause" testing is
selected, an employer must be prepared to justify its suspicion that a
particular employee is under the influence. The greater the docu-
mentation, the less legal risk. If an employer can justify a random
selection method, an employer should apply it in a wholly objective
and nondiscriminatory manner. Employers also should choose test
methods and cut-off values having short detection periods in order
to minimize intrusion into off-hours, nonemployment-related
activity.
Employers should never require involuntary administration of
these tests, although in the employment context the concept of "vol-
untary administration" presupposes that employees who refuse to
take the test may be permitted to resign instead or be subjected to
some predetermined discipline in lieu of taking the test. Employer
policies should link the severity of discipline for such a refusal to
the nature of the job or the needs of the particular workplace. On
the other hand, employers might offer an employee who refused a
test the option of undergoing rehabilitation in lieu of discipline.
Another approach might be to bar such employees from working in
particular job categories, e.g., vehicle or equipment operation, until
they have taken and passed the test.
The employer policy may call for termination of employees
who refuse to undergo drug testing. Of course, the more severe the
discipline meted out for drug use, the greater the risks of lawsuits
from aggrieved employees. Thus, employers whose policies call for
termination upon detection of drug use should be prepared to justify
the severity of the result in light of specific workplace requirements.
From the outset, whatever procedures are to be formally adopted by
an employer, they must be carefully explained to and understood by
the employees if they are to be successfully implemented.
Unfortunately, the law is too little developed to give firm legal
guidance on the legality of all drug and alcohol tests and methods of
administration in California or in any other state. In states without
constitutional privacy protection, and where invasion of privacy
106. Sedgewick, supra note 16, at 7.
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tort suits are not a threat, drug tests may not face any substantial
legal challenge. Nevertheless, even in states where all forms of test-
ing might be fully permitted, employer assaults on employee dignity
interests may find revengeful expression in some other form of tort
or contract suit brought by a disgruntled employee. Preserving em-
ployee dignity and instilling confidence in the integrity and accu-
racy of the test results, then, may go a long way toward lessening all
forms of legal risk from any drug testing program.
4. Proposed California Legislation
Given the national concern over the drug testing, it is impor-
tant to examine current legislative activity and its potential effect on
employee drug testing programs. The California legislature re-
cently passed Assembly Bill (A.B.) 4242 (Klehs and Hauser, intro-
duced February 21, 1986),107 a modest proposal which endorses the
general concept of employee drug testing, but does not affirmatively
protect employers from lawsuits arising from drug testing. A.B.
4242 was vetoed by California Governor Deukmejian on July 24,
1986.
Unlike the Assembly and Senate bills that it superseded, A.B.
4242 failed to address any of the issues that arise from either the
method of test administration or the means of employee selection
for testing. Instead, A.B. 4242 was substantively confined to (1) re-
quiring written disclosure by employers to employees of their drug
testing policies; (2) providing employees with the right to request a
copy of the results of tests performed; (3) prescribing the use of
licensed clinical or public health laboratories; and (4) imposing an
obligation upon employers, employees and laboratories to keep
samples and test results confidential.,o 8
A.B. 4242 would have been generally helpful to employers.
The text contained a clear legislative finding that "[r]educing illicit
drug use in the workplace will improve the safety, health and pro-
ductivity of all Californians" and that licensure of laboratories used
107. The text of A.B. 4242 is reproduced in Appendix C infra. The bill would have
amended Chapter 5 (commencing with section 11997) of Cal. Health and Safety Code. The
bill also provided for increases in the license fees charged to certain types of laboratories,
including those that perform employee testing. A.B. 4242 would have applied to both private
employers and to state and local entities of government.
108. Id at § 2. The confidentiality requirement would have adopted the California Infor-
mation Practices Act of 1977 by reference. This Act applies only to government entitites and
is largely inapposite to private employers. See text accompanying notes 161-65. Further, the
bill would have required compliance with the California Public Records Act, which creates a
right for individuals to inspect and copy public records. See Cal Gov't Code § 6250 et seq.
(West 1986).
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for employee testing "would balance the rights of employees with
adequate protections for the public."' 1 9 These findings would have
bolstered employer claims that California public policy supports
employee testing. But the bill provided no assurance that any par-
ticular employer testing policy would be upheld. Moreover, in Cali-
fornia, which has a constitutional right of privacy, no legislation
could have overriden any constitutional protections that may apply
to employee drug testing.
A.B. 4242 also would have amended California Labor Code
sections 1025 to 1028 to add drug rehabilitation to the "reasonable
accommodation" requirements that currently apply only to alcohol
rehabilitation.110 This accommodation requirement would have
permitted drug using employees to voluntarily enter treatment pro-
grams without adverse employment consequences unless it imposed
an undue hardship on the employer. A.B. 4242 would have re-
quired an employer to inform employees and job applicants, in writ-
ing, of its drug testing policies prior to conducting any such test.11'
This requirement would have increased the likelihood that employ-
ees who are properly informed about an employer's drug policy
would be held to have impliedly consented to the terms of the
policy.
A.B. 4242 was an amalgam of an earlier version and Senate
Bill (S.B.) 2175 (Seymour). As originally introduced, A.B. 4242
would have also (1) regulated employee drug testing; (2) required
licensing of state toxicology laboratories; and (3) prescribed certain
laboratory testing procedures. The previous version also aimed to
improve the accuracy of drug testing results, as well as the overall
quality of laboratory testing. It would have authorized the State
Department of Health Services to monitor the adequacy of labora-
tories through proficiency testing, quarterly blind testing and an-
nual inspections. This mandated program presumably would have
109. Id.
110. Id. at § 4.
111. A.B. 1482 was A.B. 4242's predecessor bill. The text of A.B. 1482 is reproduced in
Appendix B infra. This bill, introduced in the 1985 legislative session, failed in an Assembly
vote in June, 1985, but was still pending in the Assembly at the time the legislature passed.
4242.
A.B. 1482 contained several provisions in addition to its information and notice require-
ments, The bill would have allowed the employee to select the physician or laboratory that
would perform the drug tests, as well as permit the employee to delay up to 48 hours before
submitting a drug sample to the chosen physician or laboratory. These provisions were im-
practical and subject to unnecessary manipulation by the employee. The 48 hour delay would
permit sufficient time for many abused substances to fall to undetectable levels in urine or
blood samples.
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either replaced or supplemented the voluntary blind testing pro-
grams that many laboratories currently use. Laboratories would
have been required to follow agreed upon "chain of custody" proce-
dures' 1 2 for tracking samples and to consult with employers on ap-
propriate detection or threshold levels for various drugs.' 13
The original version of A.B. 4242 also required that employer
drug testing policies (1) apply to all employees in similar classes of
employment, thus eliminating opportunities to "single out" particu-
lar employees; (2) contain a double check of any positive results by
at least one "fundamentally different" testing method; (3) preserve
any positive sample for at least six months, presumably to allow
employees time to seek a retest; and (4) provide a disciplinary or
appeals process. 1
14
Overall, the original version of the bill had some positive at-
tributes, but may have proven too vague and costly to employers
and laboratories. For example, smaller employers may perform
confirmatory tests (which may cost more than $50.00 each) only if
requested by the employee. If they withhold discipline until the
tests are confirmed, no apparent harm is done to the employee un-
less the employee is wrongly accused prior to the confirmation. A
disciplinary appeals process appears to be particularly unnecessary.
If the test results confirm a positive finding, an employer need only
implement already existing disciplinary policies. Adding an institu-
tionalized forum in which the laboratory results can be challenged
in some adversary process would have been unnecessary, burden-
some and probably unworkable. If inaccurate laboratory results be-
came a problem, the proper approach would be to legislatively
restrict the use of demonstrably inadequate test methods or proce-
dures, without limiting further innovations in the process.
In distinct contrast to the original version of A.B. 4242, S.B.
2175 would have permitted employers to require employees to sub-
mit to blood, urine, breath or other chemical tests under specified
conditions 1 5 based upon "reasonable suspicion" that an employee
is "impaired or affected" by controlled substances or alcohol. Tests
112. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
113. This requirement may have been problematical. Laboratory personnel are not
trained necessarily to translate analytical data into information that employers can act upon.
Employers should instead rely upon experts in the fields of substance abuse, employee reha-
bilitation and occupational medicine to interpret laboratory data.
114. The original version of A.B. 4242 was introduced on February 21, 1986 and
amended five times prior to passage.
115. See infra Appendix D for text of S.B. 2175. Section 5 of the bill would have pre-
empted contrary laws or ordinances of other political subdivisions. Presumably this would
have invalidated the San Francisco anti-testing ordinance, discussed infra.
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would also have been permitted if an employer had a reasonable
suspicion that controlled substances were present "in an employee's
bodily system" in violation of published employer rules. This latter
provision was somewhat curious since it would be unusual for an
employer to develop a reasonable suspicion that an individual had
taken drugs in the absence of evidence of impairment or some other
indication that the employee was affected by drugs or alcohol.
Testing was also permitted under S.B. 2175 following a work-
related accident involving bodily injury or property damage. Other
"for cause" bases for testing included employer specified occur-
rences such as declining performance or absenteeism, provided that
advance notice of the testing policy is provided to employees. The
advance notice requirement also applied to regular or periodic phys-
ical examinations. S.B. 2175 permitted testing of applicants and
employees who are in a rehabilitation or employee assistance pro-
gram or who have tested positive for drugs or alcohol in the preced-
ing twelve months.
In addition to the various specified causes for testing, S.B. 2175
permitted random, "on-the-spot" or company-wide testing for all
employees once per year. Employees whose impairment would
present a safety hazard (and those who work in specified occupa-
tions) could be tested up to three times per year. The bill required
that all such testing take place pursuant to a pre-announced policy.
The narrow focus on safety issues for the expanded random testing
privilege did nothing for employers who need to maintain quality or
productivity standards but cannot demonstrate any particular
safety hazards that might result from employee impairment.
S.B. 2175 would have assisted in clearing away some of the
employer uncertainty over the legality of employee drug testing. It
would have established a clear public policy in favor of testing.
However, it would not have specifically protected employers who
discipline, discharge or attempt to rehabilitate employees on the ba-
sis of test results. This protection ought to be the principal goal of
any legislation that seeks to foster reasonable employee drug testing.
In order to provide this protection, a drug-testing bill should specifi-
cally bar any cause of action brought by an employee against an
employer to the extent that such a cause of action is based upon the
fact that the employer relied upon the results of a drug test that was
administered in conformance with the requirements of the statute.
This suggested legislation would support an employer policy calling
for a "drug-free" workplace. Such policies are designed to permit
discipline or referral for rehabilitation whenever test results indicate
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any drug traces, even if not indicative of impairment at the time of
testing.
The vetoed version of A.B. 4242 fell short of accomplishing the
goal of fully supporting employer drug testing policies. It failed to
protect employers from suits arising from drug testing. Moreover,
it should have prescribed procedures for random testing in a man-
ner even more thorough than those contained in S.B. 2175. The
most important procedure that ought to be in place before an em-
ployer requires random testing is a method to ensure that employ-
ees may not be arbitrarily selected for such testing. Employers
ought to be permitted to use any randomized selection process in
which all employees subject to the testing policy have an equal
chance of being selected. As an alternative, testing of all employees
in a functional or departmental unit should be permitted, since the
group selection minimizes the risk of arbitrary selection. Instead,
because no California law addresses them, these difficult issues may
be resolved in court rather than in the legislature.
5. The San Francisco Ordinance Prohibiting Employee
Drug Testing
The City and County of San Francisco enacted the first drug
testing prohibition in the nation on November 18, 1985.116 The or-
dinance, which became effective on December 2, 1985, bans testing
of private and public sector employees for drug or alcohol use un-
less, inter alia, there is a "clear and present danger to the physical
safety of the employee, another employee or to a member of the
public." 7 The ordinance forbids "random or company-wide" test-
ing of existing employees, but places no restriction on pre-employ-
ment testing. 118 Consequently, a San Francisco employer may still
screen applicants for drug use without violating the ordinance.
The San Francisco ordinance presents a number of problems.
First, while it exempts from the definition of "employee" uniformed
city police, fire and sheriff's personnel, police communication dis-
patchers and emergency service vehicle operators, 1 9 the ordinance,
however, ignores safety concerns presented by other occupational
groups. Presumably, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors,
116. See Appendix A.
117. Id. at § 3300A.5. The employer must also have reasonable grounds to believe that
the employee's faculties are impaired while on the job, but this requirement would in every
conceivable case be subsumed in the "clear and present danger" standard.
118. The ordinance applies only to existing employees and its prohibitions apply only to
tests that are made a condition of continued employment.
119. Id. at § 3300A.2.(1).
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which approved the measure, recognized the inherent threat to pub-
lic safety that would be posed if testing of police and safety officers
were forbidden. But, it prohibits testing of other municipal employ-
ees such as bus, subway or cable car operators. 120 Further, the ordi-
nance effectively prevents testing of private employees such as truck
drivers, fork lift operators, and heavy construction workers, whose
jobs also could endanger public safety on a daily basis.
Second, the ordinance fails altogether to accommodate legiti-
mate employer interests other than safety, such as the need to pre-
serve productivity, reduce theft and maintain product quality.
Third, the ordinance bans drug testing, but does not prohibit
use of any other means of identifying impaired employees 12' or re-
strain employers from maintaining policies that prohibit use of in-
toxicating substances during work hours.'2 ' This ban, then, will
require employers to use detection methods that are less reliable
and more subjective and arbitrary than laboratory screening. In
turn, employees more often will be disciplined or dismissed on the
basis of less reliable subjective evidence. Ironically, the need to rely
on observational data will tend to heighten employer scrutiny of
employee work performance and behavior, with an attendant de-
crease in employee privacy.
Fourth, many employers sponsor employee assistance and/or
rehabilitation programs for drug or alcohol impaired employees.
These programs typically require ongoing tests to determine that
the employee remains drug or alcohol free. On its face, the San
Francisco ordinance is a blow to employee assistance programs that
use post-identification monitoring. It would either prohibit employ-
ers from mandating participation in such a program as a condition
of continued employment or require the program to drop its testing
component, a decision that should best be left to experts in the reha-
bilitation field.
Finally, and perhaps fatally, the ordinance clashes with ex-
isting state policy to promote the use of effective test procedures and
therefore may be preempted. California Health and Safety Code
section 11554 provides:
The rehabilitation of persons addicted to controlled sub-
stances and the prevention of continued addiction to controlled
120. As one pundit has said, San Francisco's municipal railway could become the place
where "little cable cars climb halfway to the stars," possibly along with some of their opera-
tors (who will not have the benefit of drug testing).
121. Id. at § 3300A.7.
122. Id.
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substances is a matter of statewide concern. It is the policy of the
state to encourage each city and county to make use, whenever
applicable, of testing procedures to determine addiction to con-
trolled substances or the absence thereof, and to foster research
in means of detecting the existence of addiction to controlled
substances and in medical methods and procedures for that
purpose. 1
23
In short, this hastily contrived ordinance presents too many
serious problems for it to be considered a model for legislation in
other locales. It achieves some unarticulated anti-technology aim at
the expense of many legitimate employer and societal interests.
Furthermore, it may have the effect of reducing employee privacy
and increasing the risk of arbitrary employment decisions contrary
to its intent.
The current status of legislative activity in California indicates
that workplace drug problems and testing programs are not well
understood by lawmakers. Lawmakers would do well to attain a
reasonable level of knowledge concerning the area of drug testing
before they draft further legislation.
III. THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN
INVESTIGATING DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE USING
TECHNIQUES OTHER THAN SPECIMEN TESTING
Testing employees for drug and alcohol use is the most direct
and, in some cases, the most effective means of identifying and de-
terring abuse. For some employers, however, testing may be unde-
sirable for employee relations reasons. For others, testing alone
may be deemed insufficient to guarantee a drug and alcohol-free
workplace. Employers, then, commonly consider and use other
techniques to identify potential or current abuse, and the use of
these techniques should be preceded by an analysis of the potential
legal consequences.
A. Electronic Surveillance
In recent years, employers have begun to use a variety of sur-
veillance techniques to monitor employee activity in the workplace,
including both electronic surveillance, such as video cameras, and
undercover agents. Those methods remain fully lawful but there
123. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11554 (West 1982). See generally Comment,
Article 33 of the San Francisco Police Code: An Unconstitutional Exercise of Municipal Au-
thority, 17 U.S.F.L. REv. 525 (1983) (arguing the invalidity of another S.F. ordinance on
preemption grounds).
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are substantial restrictions on audio and telephone monitoring as
well as on other forms of eavesdropping.
1. Federal Wiretap Restrictions
If an employer desires to monitor an employee's telephone calls
to detect drug use and/or sales, it must be aware of the substantial
federal and state restrictions placed upon such activity. Generally,
federal law prohibits the interception of wire or oral communica-
tions but does not preempt more strict state standards.12
4
The lawfulness of any interception of wire communication de-
pends on whether the interception falls within one of the express
exceptions to the general prohibition. The most important excep-
tion allows interception when one party to the communication is
the interceptor or when one party has given prior consent to the
interception.12 5 Therefore, before implementing a monitoring pol-
icy an employer should have employees sign written statements
consenting to the employer's policy of monitoring telephone calls.
Such a consent form will give the employer significant latitude in
conducting investigations.
In addition to the consent exception, there are two other excep-
tions to the general prohibition. First, courts have created an im-
plied exception for "private communication systems."' 126 In United
States v. Christman,12 7 a criminal case, a district court held that a
department store security manager did not violate federal wiretap
laws when he surreptitiously recorded employee telephone calls on
an in-house telephone system. Although it was possible to make
calls into the public network, such calls were forbidden by store
regulations and required placement through the switchboard opera-
tors. This limited exception has been created because the definition
of "wire communication" is limited to communications made in
whole or part through the use of telephones or facilities furnished or
operated by a common carrier. 128 The exception, however, is of
124. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (West 1983). See generally Note, Electronic Monitoring in
the Workplace: The Need for Standards, 52 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 438 (1984).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(L) (West 1983); Smith v. Cincinnati Post & Times Star, 475
F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 823 (1976); Jandak v. Brookfield, 520 F. Supp. 815 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that con-
sent could not be implied merely because the party should have known of the interception).
See also Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (employee's knowledge
of employer's capability of monitoring her private telephone conversations, by itself, could
not be considered implied consent to such monitoring).
126. U.S. v. Christman, 375 F. Supp. 1354 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
127. Id.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (West 1983).
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limited use by most employers preparing an investigation because
most telephones are directly linked to the public switched network
and therefore not exempted.129
A second exception exists for "extension telephones" used "in
the ordinary course of business."130 This exception derives from the
definition of "electronic, mechanical or other device." '131 In Briggs
v. American Filter Co., Inc.,132 one court applied this exception
when an employee's supervisor had particular suspicions about con-
fidential information being disclosed to a business competitor, had
warned the employee not to disclose such information and knew
that a particular telephone call was with an agent of the competitor.
The court held that, on those facts, the supervisor's listening on an
extension phone was within the ordinary course of business. As a
result, the employer had not violated federal wiretap laws.
133
An employer's investigation of drug use may be analogous. In
order to come within the Briggs exception, however, an employer
must have strong suspicions of drug use or sales, warn employees
about the consequences of such use or sale on the job and have
cause to believe the particular employee's telephone call is drug-
related.
Not all courts will treat the use of an extension telephone in the
same way. In Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 134 the court analyzed
the phrase "in the ordinary course of business" to hold that a per-
sonal call may not be intercepted except to the extent necessary to
guard against unauthorized use of the telephone or to determine
whether the call is personal.1 35 Consequently, the contents of a per-
sonal call may not be recorded or intercepted in any manner.
Under the Watkins decision, if a supervisor listened on an ex-
tension telephone and learned immediately that the call concerned
illegal drug use or sale, he/she must hang up. Nonetheless, such
information could be used as evidence in the investigation and
might provide probable cause for a search warrant.
In summary, federal requirements are best met when employ-
ees have notice of monitoring and have given either express or im-
plied consent. Otherwise, monitoring must be limited to business
communications, using conventional telephone equipment. In the
129. Id.
130. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (West 1983).
131. Id.
132. 630 F.2d 414 (1980).
133. Id.
134. 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
135. Id. at 584.
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event a private conversation is overheard, the listener must cease
monitoring. And, even if an employer's use of audio monitoring
meets all federal standards, it must also meet those imposed by state
law.
2. California Wiretap Restrictions
Since federal wiretapping law sets minimum standards for
states, it does not preempt state legislation. 136 States are thus free
to supplement federal law with more stringent requirements. Cali-
fornia "wiretap" law has done precisely that by not recognizing the
federal exceptions discussed above. 1 37
Under California law, employers may not monitor employee
telephone calls or use amplifying or recording devices to listen in on
"confidential communications" without the consent of all parties to
the communication. 138  And the use of extension telephones for
eavesdropping on confidential communications does not fall within
an exception.1 39 The only exceptions are relative to the need to
gather evidence reasonably believed to relate to commission of a
violent felony or extortion, kidnapping or bribery.140
The California approach obviously limits an employer's use of
telephone monitoring to detect or deter drug use or sales in the
workplace. If federal jurisdiction exists employers should seek the
assistance of federal authorities to obtain a court order approving of
the wiretap procedures to be used to monitor employee conversa-
tions in all but the most obvious cases of potential violent felony,
extortion, kidnap or bribery.' 4 ' Even then, caution is warranted as
the consequence for violation of this statute is a fine and/or prison
term.142
136. U.S. v. Geller, 50 F. Supp. 1309 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 631-32 (West 1982).
138. Ribas v. Clark, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 696 P.2d 637, 212 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1985). In Ribas,
the court held that People v. Soles, 68 Cal. App. 3d 418, 136 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1977), was
erroneous to the extent it viewed section 631 as merely encompassing the use of electronic
amplifying devices. The court observed in dicta that any use of a telephone extension is
proscribed unless furnished and used pursuant to the tariffs of a public utility in the business
of providing communications services. The court alluded to current Pacific Bell tariffs that
purport to bar the overhearing of telephone conversations by non-parties without notice to all
parties. See Pac. Bell Schedule Cal. P.U.C. No. 36-T, 5th Rev. Sheet 79, eff. July 8, 1984. It
is a dubious proposition that a particular telephone company's tariff determines the legality of
telephone monitoring. The court apparently misunderstood the statutory exception for pub-
lic utility-furnished equipment.
139. Id.
140. CAL. PENAL CODE § 6335 (West 1982).
141. Id. at § 633.
142. Id. at § 631(a).
[Vol. 2
DR UGS AND ALCOHOL IN THE WORKPLACE
3. Use of Undercover Agents
Use of undercover agents posing as employees or customers is
another means of lawfully monitoring drug activity. Such an agent
can be a party to conversations that cannot be monitored lawfully
by amplifying or recording devices. This method also places agents
with some expertise at identifying drugs, drug paraphernalia and
drug transactions at the scene of suspected drug activity. The use of
a non-employee agent also avoids the problem of being forced to
rely upon fellow employees to "turn in" their co-workers and later
having to ask them to testify against their peers and friends.1 4
3
As with every other employer activity, established procedures
should be followed in surveillance and investigation so that the pro-
cess will not offend a reasonable, neutral observer (such as a judge
who might review the matter as a consequence of an employee suit).
The key to avoiding lawsuits is to preserve the dignity and privacy
of the employees who are under investigation.
B. Use of Polygraphs and Similar Devices
Twenty-two states regulate the use of polygraphs (lie detec-
tors), voice stress analyzers or similar devices in initial employment
interviews or as a condition of employment or continued employ-
ment. 144 Some states prohibit polygraph testing in the private sec-
tor, but allow testing in the public sector. 145 California, for
example, forbids involuntary polygraph testing of workers in pri-
vate industry. And a statutory exception that allows testing of all
public employees except police officers has been held unconstitu-
tional as an intrusion upon a constitutionally protected zone of indi-
vidual privacy and the court found no compelling state interest to
143. Employers should note, however, that California Labor Code § 2930(a) provides
that if a retail shopping investigator (who is a licensed private investigator) issues a report
that is to be used for disciplinary purposes, the employee must be provided with a copy of the
report during the course of any disciplinary interview. The law has no apparent applicability
to reports made by other employers, unlicensed investigators or non-retail service or commer-
cial establishments such as factories or warehouses. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2930(a) (West Supp.
1986).
Section 2390(a) appears intended to provide an opportunity for employees to be con-
fronted with the "evidence" against them and to rebut or deny the accusations. It is a good
idea to provide this type of information to employees regardless of the applicability of this
law. Employer representatives should always listen to and document the statements made by
employees who are attempting to exonerate themselves or who believe that they have been
treated unfairly in some way during the course of the investigation. Also, if, during the
course of such an interview the employee raises issues or claims that should be investigated
prior to meting out discipline, further investigation should be undertaken promptly.
144. See BNA SPECIAL REPORT, POLYGRAPHS AND EMPLOYMENT 24-25 (1985).
145. Id.
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justify the statutory scheme protecting private employees but not
public employees. 146 Additionally, many labor agreements ban the
use of polygraphs, and arbitrators seldom place much weight on test
results as proof of lying. 47 Outside of the union context, voluntary
submission to an examination usually is permissible even in states
with restrictions. It is unlawful in California and numerous other
states, however, to discipline or discharge employees for refusing to
submit to a polygraph examination. 141 California also requires that
an employee be advised in writing of the option to refuse to take a
polygraph or voice stress test. 149
Polygraph testing appeals to many employers as a direct no-
nonsense way to determine veracity. The method, however, is not
without several serious shortcomings. First, opinions vary widely
146. Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal.3d 937, 719 P.2d
660, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986). See CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2(a) (West 1981):
No employer shall demand or require any applicant for employment or
prospective employment or any similar test or examination as a condition of
employment or continued employment. The prohibition of this section does
not apply to the federal government or any agency thereof or the state govern-
ment or any agency or local subdivision thereof, including but not limited to
counties, cities and counties, cities, districts authorities, and agency.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3307 (West 1980):
No public safety officer shall be compelled to submit to a polygraph exam-
ination against his will. No disciplinary action or other recrimination shall be
taken against a public safety officer refusing to submit to a polygraph examina-
tion, nor shall any comment be entered anywhere in the investigator's notes or
anywhere else that the public safety officer refused to take a polygraph exami-
nation, nor shall any testimony or evidence be admissible at a subsequent hear-
ing, trial, or proceeding, judicial or administrative, to the effect that the public
safety officer refused to take a polygraph examination.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.3 (West Supp. 1986):
(Further, no entity in California, private or public, may) use any system
which examines or records in any manner voice prints or other voice stress
patterns of another person to determine the truth or falsity of statements made
by such other person without his or her express written consent given in ad-
vance of the examination or recordation.
See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.4 (West Supp. 1986) (no polygraph examination of com-
plaining witnesses). See also Civil Service Assn. v. Civil Service Comm., 139 Cal. App. 3d
449, 188 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1983).
147. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, Local 540 v. Neuhoff Bros.
Packers, Inc., 481 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1973). National Labor Relations Board cases involving
polygraphs usually center on an employee's claim that he or she was disciplined for union
activity, not for having failed the exam or having refused to take it. Compare, Restaurant
Management Services, Inc., 266 NLRB 779, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1044 (1983), with Consol-
idated Casinos Corp., enforced without opinion, 729 F.2d 780 (11th Cir. 1984).
148. See supra note 146.
149. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2(b) (West 1981) ("No employer shall request any person to
take such a test, or administer such a test, without first advising the person in writing at the
time the test is to be administered of the rights guaranteed by this section").
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as to the accuracy of polygraph and voice stress devices. According
to critics, when administered to employees charged with serious of-
fenses, the test itself may create enough anxiety to render the results
unreliable."' Second, although polygraph examinations can be a
tool to exonerate suspected but innocent employees who volunteer
to take the test, they cannot provide strong support against a chal-
lenge to a disciplinary action in light of the apparently widespread
legislative and scientific disapproval. 51 In pre-employment testing,
use of the polygraph invites abuses that include overly broad intru-
sions into an individual's personal life and habits.1 52 Third, even if
the exam is conducted properly, a jury might decide an applicant or
employee's privacy rights had been violated.
In one recent case, an employee was fired when the polygraph
examiner determined that the employee's denial of cocaine use was
untruthful.1 53 The employer requested the polygraph examination
because a supervisor had heard rumors that an employee of a fast
food chain was using drugs outside of work. The jury award of
$450,000 was upheld by the federal appellate court.154
Finally, if an employee chooses not to take the test, the em-
ployer may still rely on other available evidence of wrongful em-
ployee conduct to take warranted action. But in states such as
California where an employer may not condition employment on
taking the exam, an employer may have great difficulty proving that
150. See, e.g., BNA SPECIAL REPORT, POLYGRAPHS AND EMPLOYMENT 46-50 (1985)
(Professor Lykken notes: "The polygraph cannot distinguish real from irrational guilt, nor
guilt from fear, nor fear from righteous indignation").
151. See, e.g., Moniodes v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212 (1985) (former employee
awarded damages after refusing to submit to a polygraph examination; jury found that the
employee had been "constructively discharged" because her working conditions had become
intolerable); People of New York v. Hamilton, N.Y. Super. Ct., No. H49547, 1985 (employer
held liable for sexual harassment of female job applicants by polygraph examiner who not
only touched them on different parts of their bodies, but asked them questions about venereal
disease, abortion, and intimate personal relationships); Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'l Bank, 363
N.W. 2d 108 (Minn. 1985) (judgment against employer for inflicting emotional distress on an
employee through the polygraph examination, when examiner pressured employee to reveal
any acts of dishonesty in her life). But cf. Brown v. State of Tennessee, 693 F.2d 600 (6th Cir.
1982) (no sex discrimination when employer's failure to promote plaintiff was a result of his
failure to take requested polygraph exam which, in Tennessee, was a "lawful method for
determining employment related questions").
152. See, eg., Thorne v. El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct.
380 (1984) (violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by use of polygraph examination to probe private,
personal facts related to sexual conduct).
153. O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of America, Inc., 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986).
154. Id. Of that figure, $398,000 was for invasion of privacy, and $50,000 for defama-
tion. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
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an employee's refusal to take the exam had nothing to do with any
subsequent adverse action against that employee.
In all cases, the use of polygraphs should be tempered by a
concern for the adversarial employment relationship that such use
may foster, the employee privacy interests that may be disrupted
and the employee dignity that may be demeaned. And, considering
the hostility juries and legislatures have expressed recently, an em-
ployer's most prudent course would be to restrict all involuntary
polygraph use, even in states where such use is lawful.
C. Use of Medical Records
Employers investigating drug or alcohol abuse in the work-
place may wish to obtain an employee's medical records to deter-
mine if such a history exists. The employer may also wish to
cooperate with third parties conducting such an investigation by re-
leasing medical records already collected. Most states set a high
premium on an individual's right of privacy in his or her medical
history, however, and access to and release of such information is
highly regulated.
1. Employers Must Protect Medical Information
In California, for example, an employee has a constitutional
right of privacy in his or her medical records. As one appellate
court stated:
A person's medical profile is an area of privacy infinitely
more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many
areas already judicially recognized and protected.... The indi-
vidual's right to privacy encompasses not only the state of his
mind, but also his viscera, detailed complaints of physical ills,
and their emotional overtones. The state of a person's gastroin-
testinal tract is as much entitled to privacy from unauthorized
public or bureaucratic snooping as is that person's bank account,
the contents of his library or his membership in the NAACP.
We conclude the specie of privacy here sought to be invaded falls
squarely within the protected ambit and the expressed objectives
of Article I, Section 1.15
In addition to the Constitutional protection afforded medical
records, California has a tough statutory provision entitled the Con-
155. Div. of Medical Quality v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55
(1979); see also Jones v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1981)
(California constitutional right of privacy extends beyond the confidential communications
protected by statute and includes a person's medical history).
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fidentiality of Medical Information Act. 156 That act sets forth the
specific circumstances in which medical information can and cannot
be disclosed and identifies the parties to whom the information can
be provided. An employer can obtain medical information only if
the employee "authorizes" the release of the information pursuant
to a rigid set of guidelines. 157 The guidelines contain exceptions
(e.g. lawfully issued search warrant), but those exceptions do not
cover an employer engaged in general information gathering.
158
Moreover, the statute forbids any retaliation against an employee
who refuses to release records,'59 and provides a full range of dam-
ages for the improper release of confidential employee information
including punitive damages and attorneys' fees.
160
2. Employers have Restricted Access to Employee
Information Collected by the Government.
Both Congress and the California legislature have recognized
the need to protect private citizens from unwarranted disclosure of
personal information gathered by government agencies. Thus, Con-
gress enacted the Federal Privacy Act of 1974,161 and in 1977, Cali-
fornia enacted The Information Practices Act. 162
The California Act, which is patterned after the Federal Pri-
vacy Act, requires that each agency "notify" the public that the
agency maintains personal and confidential information, describe
the type of information collected and indicate the purposes for
which it is collected.' 63 The Act also requires that the information
be disclosed to the individual concerned when so requested and pre-
vents its disclosure to third parties.'
As a practical matter, the federal and state privacy acts repre-
sent major hurdles to an employer seeking any type of information
contained in a government fie about an employee. The type of in-
formation an employer would like to view, such as information con-
taining medical, psychiatric or psychological material, is classified
as "confidential information" and simply cannot be obtained with-
out the prior written voluntary consent of the individual to whom
156. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56 et seq. (West 1983).
157. Id. at §§ 56.10-56.11.
158. Id.
159. Id. at § 56.20(b).
160. Id. at §§ 56.35-56.36.
161. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
162. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798 (Vest Supp. 1986).
163. Id. at § 1798.10.
164. Id. at § 1798.24.
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the record pertains. 165
An employer's simplest approach to obtaining medical records
and information, then, is to request that all employees authorize the
release of information when reasonably necessary to further an in-
vestigation. The likelihood of gaining a more specific and voluntary
authorization, however, may be dim if the employee is the focus of
the investigation.
In short, an employer's use of medical records as an investiga-
tive tool to determine drug use is not a particularly viable option.
The law sets a high premium on an individual's right of privacy in
his medical history, and requires that an employer obtain the volun-
tary consent of the employee to gain access to the information. This
requirement forces the employer to make the employee immediately
aware that he or she is under investigation, which in turn provides
an employee the opportunity to temporarily stop using drugs or
otherwise cover up drug activites. Additionally, if the records con-
tain any information about which the employee is concerned,
whether drug related or not, it is probable that the employee will
not authorize the release. And, even if medical records are ob-
tained, they may be considered of limited relevance if they simply
refer to past alcohol or drug use. Indeed, more often than not, such
records would be helpful only to test the veracity of any individual
confronted with suspected present abuse. Thus, alternative infor-
mation sources may serve the employer's investigatory needs in a
less intrusive and more relevant manner.
D. Arrest Records
Statutory curbs on access to and use of arrest records for em-
ployment purposes exist in at least 12 states. 166 Most statutory re-
strictions apply to pre-employment inquiries only, but the
possibility of adverse racial impact effectively restricts the use of
arrest records for most other purposes as well. Courts commonly
recognize that members of minority racial groups are arrested more
often than non-minorities. 67 Some of these arrests are believed to
be discriminatory and, therefore, courts routinely strike down an
165. Id. at §§ 1798.3 and 1798.24.
166. See generally LAB. REL. REP. vol. 8.
167. See, eg., Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970);
McCray v. Alexander, 29 FEP 653, 658 (D. Colo. 1982) (recognizing disparate impact of
arrests on minorities but holding discharge of black employee guard arrested for fatally
shooting someone in an off-duty incident).
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absolute bar on hiring or retaining arrestees. 16s
California law permits no interview questions or use of infor-
mation concerning arrests that did not result in convictions, unless
the applicant is still awaiting trial. 169  Convictions are usually
treated differently. Generally an employer may screen employees
for past criminal convictions. The difference rests on the notion
that a judicial determination of guilt in a criminal case, with the
attendant constitutional safeguards, is far less likely than an arrest
to be the product of arbitrary action. An automatic exclusion of all
persons convicted of any crimes, however, may violate Title VII if
there is a sufficient discriminatory impact.1 70 Thus, an employer
who bases an adverse decision upon a criminal conviction must be
prepared to justify the action as a business necessity. An employer
must be able to demonstrate how the conviction is job-related, a
difficult task if the conviction is remote in time or the job in ques-
tion does not expose the company to risks similar to the crime for
which the individual was convicted.1 71
E. Searches of Employee Property and Possessions
When an employee is suspected of possessing, using or selling
illegal drugs or alcohol, an employer may want to search the em-
ployee or the employee's locker, work area or possessions. Such
searches can be lawful and effective. On the other hand, an em-
ployer risks serious liability if a search is inconsistent with state and
federal legal principles and reasonable business practices.1 72
1. Searching the Person and Personal Effects
The likelihood of a successful challenge to an employer search
will be minimized if the employer had "reasonable cause" to believe
168. See, eg., Gregory v. Litton Sys. Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403; Dozier v. Chupka, 395
F.Supp. 836, 850 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
169. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(a) (West 1977).
170. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
171. See generally Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La.
1971), aff'd mein., 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972) (bellman's discharge for pre-employment
theft conviction justified as job related). The State of Washington bars employment inquiries
regarding convictions for which the date of the conviction or prison release (whichever is
more recent) occurred more than seven years prior to the date of the inquiry. WAsH. ADMIN.
CODE § 162-16-060 (1982). California's Fair Employment and Housing Commission also has
proposed regulations to limit employer questioning regarding past convictions, but has not
acted on this proposal. In California, however, employees may not be discharged for a pre-
1976 conviction for possession of marijuana in an amount that would not be illegal after the
1976 reform legislation. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.8 (West 1976).
172. For a discussion of the general principles of search and seizure law see supra notes
79-83 and accompanying text.
1986]
COMPUTER & HIGH-TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
the employee possessed prohibited drugs or alcohol and the affected
employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas or
items searched.17 In turn, whether such cause or expectation is
reasonable will depend on all of the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the individual case.
Absent a voluntary, noncoerced consent or the existence of a
pre-announced search policy to which employees may be deemed to
have consented, an employer may not conduct a general search of
an employee's property and person, even when the employer has
probable cause to believe the employee possesses illegal drugs or
impermissible alcohol. Rather, an employer must confine the
search to items in "plain view," which will be held to contain no
reasonable expectation of privacy. 74
Suspect items do not necessarily lose their "plain view" status
when placed in boxes, shopping bags or similar packages in which
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, in Peo-
ple v. Carter,175 a security officer's seizure and search of a box con-
taining stolen merchandise was held not to violate the "plain view"
requirement. Similarly, in People v. Patel,'76 the court upheld the
seizure and search of a bag containing an electronic game on which
the price tag had been switched. "The fact that the game was en-
closed in a paper bag provided by the store did not cause the game
to be lost from plain view. It merely had a different cover over it
than before."' 177
Both Carter and Patel point out that since the containers were
provided by the store, the defendants had no "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy" by using them. The Carter court implied that "a
private container.., such as a purse, in which the suspects had any
reasonable expectation of privacy," could not be examined under
the "plain-view" privilege.' 78 The Patel court stated that "the situ-
173. The law surrounding searches of employee possessions has developed in the crimi-
nal context. Thus most of the decisions discussed in this section involve criminal conduct.
Nonetheless, the reasoning applies equally in the civil, employment context, at least to uncon-
sented searches. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
174. People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1979) (holding that neither
common law nor California's statutory provision, CAL. PENAL CODE § 490.5 (e)(3) (West
1983), empowers search of items not in plain view).
175. 117 Cal. App. 3d 735, 172 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1981). In the Carter case, a department
store security officer observed the defendants placing merchandise inside a large cardboard
box. The defendants then taped a receipt from a previous purchase onto the sealed box with a
store security strip and left the store.
176. 121 Cal. App. 3d 20, 175 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1981).
177. Id. at 23.
178. 117 Cal. App. 3d at 738.
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ation presented to us here is entirely different from the search of a
person's handbag or other container intended for numerous per-
sonal effects." 179 If an item is not visible, then, the search will be
held reasonable only if the affected employee can be said to have
had no reasonable expectation of privacy. To avoid such factual
determinations, an employer should in most circumstances take the
conservative approach by limiting all unauthorized searches to
items in plain view.
2. Searching Personal Effects.in Company Facility
A different situation arises when the object of the search is not
the employee's person or personal property, but property supplied
by the employer for work-related use. Several cases have held that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in an employer-owned
locker when an established policy of unconsented locker inspection
exists.180
In Williams v. Collins,"'1 for example, an employee's supervi-
sors searched his desk and office, including a locked desk drawer,
without a warrant. The supervisors also seized personal items in
the desk for safekeeping. The court held that whether it was part of
179. 121 Cal. App. 3d at 23. Following the Zelinski, Carter and Patel cases, California
Penal Code § 490.5(e) was amended to allow merchants and library personnel to search
"packages, shopping bags, handbags or other property in the immediate possession of the
person detained ... " CAL. PENAL CODE § 490.5(e)(4) (West Supp. 1986). Thus, it appears
the scope of a personal search under the common law interpretation of "plain view" may be
more restricted than that allowed to merchants and librarians. While an employer might
argue that § 490.5(e)(4) should apply by analogy to the workplace, the stronger argument
would be that the legislature meant to exempt only merchants and librarians.
180. See United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 989
(1975) (warrantless search of a postal employee's locker for stolen C.O.D. parcels upheld
because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the locker since (1) a regulation
allowed for such searches when there was reasonable cause to suspect criminal activity; and
(2) the defendant had been fully advised of the regulation and the conditions placed upon her
use of the locker and the postal service's right to search it); Los Angeles Police Protective
League v. Gates, 579 F. Supp. 36, 44 (C.D. Ca. 1984); United States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp.
921 (E.D. Pa.), affid, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1967) (warrantless search of a U.S. Mint em-
ployee's locker by security guards was upheld when (1) there was a government regulation
providing that lockers were not to be considered private lockers; (2) all employee lockers
were subject to inspection and were regularly inspected by security guards for sanitation pur-
poses; and (3) security guards had a master key that opened all the employee lockers); Schaf-
fer v. Field, 339 F. Supp. 997 (C.D. Cal. 1972), afl'd, 484 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1973) (no
reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a deputy sheriff's station house locker when (1)
the locks had both keys and combinations but the commander kept a master key and the
combination to all locks; (2) the lockers and locks were not permanently assigned but could
be changed at will; and (3) on at least three occasions in the past, deputies' lockers had been
searched by commanders without the deputies' permission).
181. 728 F.2d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 1984).
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the investigation or a simple inventory of materials in the office, a
search of the employee's desk was within the outer perimeter of de-
fendants' line of duty."8 2
There are, however, cases holding that a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy does exist in an employee's locker. In U.S. v.
Speights,183 a policeman was held to have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his locker even though it was owned by the police
department and could, absent an added personal lock, be opened
with a master key. The court stated that reliance on specific regula-
tions and practices can support a finding that an expectation of pri-
vacy was or was not reasonable. 184 In this case, there was no
regulation or practice that would have alerted an officer to expect
unconsented locker searches. 8 Additionally, the use of private
locks on a number of the lockers had been tacitly approved by the
department.
Similarly, in Tucker v. Superior Court,1 86 a restaurant em-
ployee was held to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
closed but unlocked locker. There was no notice, regulation or
practice within the organization pertaining to locker searches and
each employee was allowed to use a personal lock on his locker if he
or she so desired.
It is dificult to draw conclusions to be drawn from these two
conflicting lines of authority. It is likely, however, that searches
will be upheld if the employer has an established policy of uncon-
sented locker or other property inspections. It appears that once
employees are notified that searches of lockers, desks or other prop-
erty may occur, they cannot have an expectation of privacy in that
property, particularly if the notice states what property is the target
of potential searches. The employer must take affirmative steps to
ensure that the employees are informed of the policy, and must be
sure to follow its policy.' 87
An even more difficult situation arises when a personal effect,
182. Id. at 728. In Williams, the main issue was whether a federal government em-
ployee's supervisors had absolute immunity from common law tort liability for actions they
took in dismissing the employee. In People v. Minervini, 20 Cal. App. 3d 832, 98 Cal. Rptr.
107 (1971), the court held that a motel manager has the right to enter a room in a reasonable
manner to determine if motel property is being damaged or destroyed. The right of an em-
ployer to inspect his property, even if being used by his employees, is strongly analogous. If
criminal activity is suspected, the employer may have more freedom to search.
183. 557 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1977).
184. Id. at 365.
185. Id.
186. 84 Cal. App. 3d 43, 148 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1978).
187. See infra Section III.
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like a purse or lunch box, is stored in a company-supplied facility,
such as a locker. It could be argued that the employee relinquishes
some privacy interest in the personal effect by storing it in the
locker. The better view, however, is that, since it is necessary to
place the items somewhere and it would be unreasonable to forbid
bringing any personal effects into the workplace, the items are enti-
tled to the same respect as if they were personally held by the em-
ployee. In other words, without a properly announced search
policy to the contrary, it may not be proper for an employer to
search the purse or lunch box stored in the locker.
1 88
Despite this apparent limitation, several cases have permitted
searches of a person's property or personal effects for contraband
when the property or effects were placed in a locker.1 89 It should be
noted that in these cases the issue presented was whether the drugs
discovered by the search could be admitted into evidence or had to
be suppressed at the criminal trial. As a result, the rules set forth in
these cases do not apply directly, but must be analogized to apply in
the civil context.
3. Practical Advice to Employer Conducting Searches
The practical effect of all of the above case law is that search
procedures should be announced well in advance and should be de-
scribed in detail in a written communication to all employees.
Those who are subject to these policies will ordinarily be deemed to
have consented to them, but employers should seek express written
consent, whenever practical, before proceeding with an intrusive
search. All searches should be conducted so that an employee's dig-
nity is preserved. Searches of areas that are not explicitly permitted
in the company policy manual should be governed by a strict policy
requiring a reasonable or rational basis for believing that impermis-
sible goods or evidence of impermissible activity are present, bar-
ring the existence of some other compelling business reason that
supports such a search. 19 0 As a general rule, a search of company
188. See People v. Crowson, 33 Cal. 3d 623, 190 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1983).
189. See, ag., K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W. 2d 633 (Tex. App. 1984).
190. See, eg., People v. Lanthier, 5 Cal. 3d 751 (1971) (janitor's search of student's
locker in which he discovered drugs was lawful where there was immediate need to discover
source of noxious odor); New Jersey v. TLO, 105 S.Ct. 733 (1985) (school authorities permit-
ted to search student locker for contraband based upon lessened degree of probable cause,
despite applicability of Fourth Amendment to the search); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d
509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969) (vice-principal's search of student's locker lawful; school acts in
loco parentis); People v. Dickson, 91 Cal. App. 3d 409, 154 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1979). See also
People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973),
overruled on other grounds; People v. Dalton, 24 Cal. 3d 850, 598 P.2d 467, cert. denied, 445
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property is considered less subject to privacy considerations than a
search of employee personal property.
Investigations of possible illegal activities should be handled by
trained security personnel, the police or outside experts, whenever
practical.1 91 If prosecution is contemplated, the police should be
consulted at an early stage. Employers should take the time to be-
come acquainted with the local police practices in drug cases. This
effort will assure better coordination when police help is needed.
Evidence of employee violations of company drug rules need
satisfy only normal company disciplinary standards for discipline to
be imposed. Generally, for employee relations reasons, the com-
pany standard for disciplinary action should require a good faith
belief that a violation has occurred. Such a belief requires some
credible evidence obtained in a reasonable investigation that con-
formed with company policies regarding investigations. Such evi-
dence need not be convincing "beyond a reasonable doubt" since
that standard applies only to criminal prosecutions. The employer
should also be aware that, in taking possession of incriminating evi-
dence prior to police involvement, any possible criminal prosecution
will be affected by mishandling of the evidence that might occur.
IV. USING THE RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIONS: AVOIDING
LEGAL PITFALLS
The conclusion of the above discussion is that when an em-
ployer conducts an investigation of an individual's drug or alcohol
involvement, it must be aware of the applicable legal doctrines and
concomitant potential liability. In particular, an employer must re-
spect emerging privacy doctrines and related legal protections in
statutes or in tort law. Similarly, an employer must consider pri-
vacy and search and seizure law when taking adverse action against
an applicant or employee based on the results of such an investiga-
tion. Additionally, an employer must consider whether an adverse
act would violate other legal rights. The most important of those
potentially applicable legal principles - namely civil rights stat-
U.S. 946 (1980) (an airline, as a common carrier, has the right to inspect suspicious-looking
packages for illicit drugs).
191. In many instances the search powers of the police may exceed those of the em-
ployer, particularly if no search policy covers the area that is to be searched. See, e.g., United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (drug sniffing dogs may sniff luggage in public place
without upsetting reasonable expectation of privacy); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (police
may "stop and frisk" for purpose of investigating possible illegal behavior even though there
is not probable cause to make an arrest).
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utes, handicap discrimination law and various tort theories are
briefly reviewed below.
If one basic guideline emerges from a study of these doctrines,
it is that an employer must apply its drug or alcohol policies in the
same fair and nondiscriminatory manner as any other work rules.
Such even-handedness may not prevent lawsuits in all circum-
stances, but it will go a long way toward a meritorious defense.
A. Civil Rights Statutes
To date, courts have considered very few civil rights claims in
which an employee or employees challenge an employer's enforce-
ment of a drug or alcohol policy. As work-related substance abuse
increases, however, the number of cases will increase as well. The
following briefly describes the most common sources of potential
liability for civil rights violations relating to drug and alcohol pro-
grams in the workplace.
1. The Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871
Congress enacted a series of civil rights statutes following the
Civil War that provide some remedy against employment discrimi-
nation. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1870, better known as
section 1981,192 provides that "all persons" shall have the same
right "to make and enforce contracts" and the same full and equal
benefit of all "laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens." Section 1981 applies to
acts of racial and alienage discrimination by private employers.
19 3
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, particularly section 1983,191 also
provides protection. Section 1983 broadly provides a right of action
when, under "color of law," an individual is deprived of any
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws .... ." It is thus not limited to claims of race or alienage dis-
crimination, but applies equally to discrimination based on sex or
192. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
193. Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971) (denial of welfare benefits to resident aliens violates § 1981). It is
unsettled whether § 1981 also applies to discrimination based on sex or religion. The major-
ity view, however, appears to be that it does not. See, e.g., Foreman v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
473 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Mich. 1979). On the other hand, a majority of courts permit a § 1981
action if a claim is based on "nonwhite" ethic or national origin discrimination. See, e.g.,
Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Eng'r, Inc., 597 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1979).
194. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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religion, as well as other factors.195
In general, section 1983 covers only claims in which state or
local governmental agencies or officials are involved in the chal-
lenged practice. 196 Nonetheless, private employers may be impli-
cated through state involvement in regulation, licensing, and/or
receipt of public funds.' 97 Similarly, private employers that carry
out functions normally exercised by the state or who participate in
state-supported monopoly situations may come under the coverage
of section 1983.198
Because of the unavailability of respondeat superior under sec-
tion 1983, an employer who had no direct role in the constitutional
violation may be able to avoid liability. 199 An employer, however,
may be forced to indemnify the individual actor under state law
200provisions.
Under certain circumstances, then, sections 1981 and 1983
may provide a remedy if an employer's drug or alcohol policies
have been discriminatorily or unlawfully applied. For example, in
Evans v. Roadway Express, Inc.,201 a district court upheld the dis-
charge of a black employee who had been fired because he had been
under the influence of alcohol on the job and because he refused to
take a sobriety test. The court dismissed the employee's section
1981 action because it found no evidence that similarly situated
white employees had been treated differently.
In another recent case, Thorne v. City of El Segundo,2 °2 an em-
ployee brought a section 1983 claim against the city police depart-
ment for failure to hire her into a police officer position. She argued
195. See Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975) (sex); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (religion).
196. See generally Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1960).
197. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (state action found
in equal protection case where black citizen denied service in a restaurant owned by a public
authority but leased to a private organization); but cf Rendel-Baker v. Kohn, 456 U.S. 830
(1982) (insufficient state action showing under § 1983 claim).
198. See, eg., Martin v. Pac. Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 441 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971) (even though Pacific Bell is a private corporation that enjoys
state-protected monoply, there was insufficient showing of state action).
199. Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also, Traver v. Meshriy,
627 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1980) (§ 1983 action brought against off-duty police officer who
stopped plaintiff from leaving a bank when he mistakenly believed the plaintiff had defrauded
the bank; court expressed reservations about holding the bank liable under § 1983 absent
evidence of direct involvement, but upheld judgment because there were prudent state claims
of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution).
200. See, eg., CAL. LAB. CODE § 2802 (West 1971) (employer must indemnify employee
for losses incurred as a "direct consequence of the discharge of his duties").
201. 1985 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) 1 35,240 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
202. 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 380 (1984).
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that the defendants (two supervisors and a polygraph examiner) vi-
olated her constitutionally protected rights of privacy and free asso-
ciation when they rejected her application based on information
about her sexual activities learned during a screening polygraph
test. The court agreed, stating that while an employer may consider
the sexual morality of its employees, it must set reasonable guide-
lines for inquiry and relevance to job performance.20 3 The same
reasoning would apply to inquiries about drug or alcohol, although
the illegal nature of most drugs makes inquiry somewhat less vul-
nerable to attack.
2. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642' forbids discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. In
the event an anti-alcohol or drug policy excluded a high proportion
of minorities or women, an employer might be required under Title
VII to demonstrate that the rule was "job related."
In the only major decision so far on this issue, New York City
Transit Authority v. Beazer,2 °5 the Supreme Court considered
whether a transit authority's policy of refusing employment to per-
sons who use narcotics, including methadone, violated Title VII.
The Court held the plaintiffs' statistical proof of the policy's dis-
criminatory effect on Blacks and Hispanics was insufficent to state a
claim.
Whenever enforcement of a drug or alcohol policy requires
large scale actions, such as the termination of or the failure to hire
numerous employees, an employer should be prepared to demon-
strate that the policy is job-related and not instituted for a discrimi-
natory purpose. In addition, an employer should be mindful of the
significance of Title VII if arrest records are taken into account.2 ° 6
B. Handicap Discrimination Law
An employer who takes adverse action against an applicant for
employment or an existing employee because of suspected drug or
alcohol use or abuse also must consider whether this action violates
203. Id. at 471.
204. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-3 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSS-
MAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (2d ed. 1983) for a detailed discussion of the
procedural and substantive aspects of this statutory scheme.
205. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
206. See supra notes 166-171 and accompanying text.
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provisions protecting handicapped persons. Federal law2"7 and the
laws of at least 36 states forbid discrimination against persons who
meet the applicable statutory definitions of "handicapped"
person.208
1. Federal Handicap Discrimination Law
Title V of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 20 9protects
handicapped individuals from discrimination by federal employ-
212
ers,2  reiiet of federal financial assistane 211 and certain federal
contractors.212
The Act defines a "handicapped individual" as "any person
who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a
record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
207. See Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1976 & Supp.
III 1979).
208. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra, note 204 at 277, n.87 ("Only Delaware,
North Dakota, South Carolina, and Wyoming have no statutory or executive order prohibi-
tions against discrimination on the basis of handicap").
209. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796(i) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
210. Id. at § 791.
211. Id. at § 794. See also 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h) (1984), which provides that "federal fi-
nancial assistance" is defined as:
any grant, loan, contract (other than a procurement contract or a contract of
insurance or guaranty), or any other arrangement by which the Department
... makes available assistance in the form of: (1) Funds; (2) Services of Fed-
eral personnel, or (3) Real and personal property or any interest in or use of
such property ....
The Supreme Court recently confirmed that a private individual may sue under this section
even if the "primary objective" of the federal funding is not to promote employment. Consol-
idated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984). The Darrone court also clarified that the
§ 504 prohibition against discrimination does not apply to all of the employer's activities, but
only to those involving federal funds. Id. at 635. Each federal agency providing federal
assistance enforces compliance of its own recipients. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 and Supp. III
1979).
212. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 503 requires that all federal con-
tracts and subcontracts in excess of $2,500 include clauses in which the contractor agrees (1)
not to discriminate and (2) "to take affirmative action to employ, advance in employment and
otherwise treat qualified handicapped individuals without discrimination based upon their
physical or mental handicap in all employment practices such as the following: employment,
upgrading, demotion or transfer, recruitment, advertising, layoff or termination, rates of pay
or other forms of compensation, and selection for training, including apprenticeship." 41
C.F.R. § 60-741.4(a) (1985); 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1976 and Supp. III 1979). The affirmative
action requirement applies to any of the contractor's facilities, even if not directly linked to
the government contract, unless a waiver is sought and received. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.3(a)(5).
To date the majority opinion is that § 503 provides no private right of action. See, e.g.,
Fisher v. Tucson, 663 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1981); but cf Davis v. Modine Mfg. Co., 526 F.
Supp. 943 (D. Kan. 1981) (private right of action).
1986] DR UGUS AND ALCOHOL IN THE WORKPLACE
impairment." '213 The term, however, expressly excludes "any indi-
vidual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alco-
hol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of
the job in question or whose employment, by reason of such current
alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property
or the safety of others." '214 The legislative history of this exclusion
indicates that Congress sought to "exclude alcoholics and drug
abusers in need of rehabilitation from the definition of handicapped
individual" for purposes of employment discrimination.215
Thus, an employer is free to take appropriate adverse action if
the individual in question (1) is an alcoholic or a drug abuser; and
(2) is currently using alcohol or drugs; and (3) is unable to satisfac-
torily perform his or her duties as a direct result of the drugs or is a
threat to property or safety. The obvious and serious problem for
employers who seek to use this exclusion is how to prove that the
individual meets each of the statutory requirements.216
The Rehabilitation Act fails to mention rehabilitated alcoholics
and former drug users or abusers, so it is not settled whether they
are protected as "handicapped." In Johnson v. Smith,2 17 a district
court held a former drug abuser had stated a prima facie case under
section 504 of the Act. In Johnson, an applicant for a job as a cor-
rectional officer with the Federal Bureau of Prisons listed his prior
213. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
214. Id.
215. Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 129-130 (D.D.C. 1984), quoting, H.R.
Rep. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7312, 7333-34.
216. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has determined that § 504 handicap
cases are to be decided using a modified Title VII allocation of proof. See Sisson v. Helms,
751 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1985). For cases considering various proof issues, see for example
Healy v. Bergman, 37 EMPL. PRAC. DEc. (CCH) § 35,320 (D. Mass. 1985) (case remanded
so federal agency could prove reasons why terminated employee's alcoholism did or did not
prevent him from performing his job where employee was fired for voluntarily entering a
treatment program); MeCleod v. City of Detroit, 39 FEP Cas. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (mari-
juana users not qualified because evidence showed use of the drug can adversely affect a
firefighter's ability to perform); Huff v. Israel, 573 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ga. 1983) (city prop-
erly concluded alcoholic compliance officer was unable to perform when he received three
convictions for driving while intoxicated in five year period); Guerriro v. Schultz, 557 F.
Supp. 511 (D.D.C. 1983) (alcoholic foreign service officer unqualified for job because he ad-
mitted need for continuing therapy); Walker v. Weinberger, 600 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1985)
(federal employee suit under 29 U.S.C. § 791, which requires reasonable accommodation and
affirmative action for handicapped federal employees; former alcoholic's pre-rehabilitation
discipline record could not be used in aid of non-alcohol-related subsequent discipline to
justify dismissal). But see 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 app. A(4) (1985) (in § 504 cases the employer
may consider "past personnel records, absenteeism, disruptive, abusive, or dangerous behav-
ior, violations of rules and unsatisfactory work performance").
217. 39 FEP Cas. 1106 (D. Minn. 1985).
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drug use in detail on his application.21 The Bureau rejected his
application because of his history of drug and alcohol dependency.
The Johnson court held the plaintiff had stated a prima facie case
and that whether he was as qualified as the other applicants or able
to perform the job were questions to be decided at trial.219
As a result, former abusers probably will be protected if they
have a record of impairment or if they are incorrectly regarded as
being presently unable to perform their duties. Curiously, former
users who were not abusers may not be considered handicapped
since it is possible they would have no record of impairment and, as
mere former users, could not presently be considered or regarded as
"disabled. ,220
Even rehabilitated alcoholics and drug abusers, however, must
demonstrate their impairments substantially limit one or more ma-
jor life activities in order to prevail in an action under the Rehabili-
tation Act.221 "Major life activities" include such actions as "caring
for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, learning and working. ' 222 In Lake City Corp. v. Con-
fer,223 a state court concluded that the mere privilege of working in
one particular job for one particular employer could not be consid-
ered a "major life activity" for purposes of stating a claim under the
Utah Anti-discrimination Act.224 The court suggested that to hold
otherwise would subject every employer to a finding of discrimina-
tion. On the other hand, the court recognized that an impairment
that precluded work altogether would surely fit the description.225
The court concluded:
Whether employment of a particular type in a particular in-
dustry is a "major life activity" is a question of fact, to be re-
solved upon consideration of the nature of the desired
218. The Johnson plaintiff had "used marijuana almost daily from 1969 to 1977 ... had
used speed 50 to 70 times, LSD 10 times, hashish 50 to 100 times, downers 5 times and
alcohol frequently." Id.
219. See also Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (three former drug
addicts denied employment by City solely on basis of prior use held to be protected by § 504
of the Act); 28 C.F.R. § 540 (1985); but cf, McGarvey v. D.C., 29 FEP Cases 954 (D.D.C.
1979) (drug addiction was related to qualification for ambulance technician job).
220. See, e.g., Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D. Ga. 1983) ("impair-
ment" does not include transitory illnesses that have no permanent effect on the person's
health); see also De La Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir.) (1986) (left-handedness is
not an impairment).
221. 29 U.S.C. § 706 (7)(B) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
222. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(C) (1985).
223. 674 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1983).
224. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-1 (1983).
225. 674 P.2d at 636-37.
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employment by comparison to related types of employment in
the same or other industries and the reasons for the applicant's
preference for the job in question over all others.2 26
In the case of McCleod v. City of Detroit,227 the district court
ruling on the same issue upheld pre-employment urinalysis screen-
ing for city firefighter applicants, where the plaintiffs were rejected
due to positive marijuana test results. Rejecting the claim that the
individuals were "handicapped," the court found that no evidence
was introduced at trial that being a firefighter was a major life activ-
ity.228 The court held that would be true even if the use of mari-
juana qualified as an impairment under the Act.2 29
The McCleod plaintiffs sought to avoid this result by arguing
that the City's presumption regarding the impairment from mari-
juana use (reduced memory, coordination and risk-taking ability)
was erroneous. Thus, plaintiffs argued they were not actually im-
paired but were impermissibly regarded as being impaired in viola-
tion of section 504 of the Act.
The court rejected this "impairment" argument, finding that
even if the plaintiffs had established a substantial impairment of a
major life activity, the City could establish that the criteria were job
related and required by job necessity.230 The court held that use of
marijuana can adversely affect a firefighter's ability to do his or her
job. The challenged criteria were job-related and required by busi-
ness necessity since they "implicated the possibility of endangering
the property and safety of others.
231
2. California Handicap Discrimination Law
California's handicap statute is similar to federal law with re-
gard to alcoholism or drug abuse. California Government Code
Section 12920 prohibits an employer with five or more employees
from discriminating against an employee or applicant on the basis
of "physical handicap. '2 32  "Physical handicap includes impair-
226. Id. at 637.
227. 39 F.E.P. Cases 225 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
228. Id. at 228.
229. Id.
230. Id. See generally Southwestern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)
(a claimant must possess the necessary qualifications to be designated "handicapped").
231. Id.
232. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12920 (West 1982).
It is hereby delared as the public policy of this state that it is necessary to
protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain,
and hold employment without discrimination or abridgement on account of
1986]
COMPUTER & HIGH-TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
ment of sight, hearing, or speech, or impairment of physical ability
because of amputation or loss of function or coordination, or any
other health impairment which requires special education or related
services. '233  By regulation, however, the definition of physical
handicap excludes mental illness, alcoholism and narcotics
addiction.234
In American National Insurance Co. v. Fair Employment and
Housing Commission,235 the California Supreme Court interpreted
these provisions to protect any person having a serious, non-tempo-
rary physical disability that makes job achievement unusually diffi-
cult. The court held that high blood pressure falls within the
meaning of "handicapped" even if the condition is not presently
disabling.23
6
California law requires employers with 25 or more employees
to "reasonably accommodate any employee who wishes to volunta-
rily enter and participate in an alcoholic rehabilitation program,
provided that this reasonable accommodation does not impose an
undue hardship on the employer." '237 Whether an "undue hard-
ship" exists depends on "the size and type of the employer and facil-
ity, the nature and cost of the accommodation involved, notice to
the employer of the need for the accommodation, and any reason-
able alternative means of accommodation. 23
8
Under this new law, an employer need not provide time off
with pay but must allow the employee to use any accrued sick leave
to attend a rehabilitation program.239 Moreover, the statute specifi-
cally states that an employer need not hire or retain an employee
whose "current use of alcohol" prevents performance of duties or
endangers the safety of the employee or others.240
Once an employee enters a rehabilitation program an employer
has a responsibility to "make reasonable efforts to safeguard the pri-
race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical handicap, medi-
cal condition, marital status, sex or age.
233. Id. at § 12926(h).
234. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, Tit. 2, § 7293.6(a)(4) (West Supp. 1986).
235. 32 Cal. 3d 603, 651 P.2d 1151 (1982).
236. Id. at 610.
237. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1025-28 (West Supp. 1986). Two recently proposed legislative
measures would have added "drug" rehabilitation to CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1025-1028. See
A.B. 4242 (Appendix C). (Klehs, Feb. 21, 1986) and S.B. 2175 (Appendix D) (Seymour, Feb.
20, 1986). A.B. 4242 was passed by the California legislature but was vetoed by the
Governor.
238. 1984 CAL. STAT. C. 1103, § 2, rule 12.3 (1985).
239. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1027 (West Supp. 1986).
240. Id. at § 1025.
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vacy of the employee as to the fact that he or she is enrolled in an
alcoholic rehabilitation program."241 An employee who believes an
employer has failed to meet its obligation under these statutes may
file a complaint with the Labor Commissioner, who is required to
investigate and prosecute, if necessary. 242 As yet, there are no cases
interpreting these accommodation statutes.
3. Practical Considerations in Light of Handicap Law
As a practical matter, claims of handicap discrimination
should be taken seriously even if they arise out of an employer's
anti-drug policy. Neither the federal nor the California exclusion
for alcohol and drug abusers is sufficiently clear or comprehensive
to provide simple, consistent rules concerning these cases.
Until the law becomes settled, employers should let business
needs guide their drug policies knowing that current abusers are not
protected and that casual users not claiming to be addicted may not
be considered to be "handicapped." In addition, since an employer
need not hire any employee incapable of performing the job, em-
ployers should document an applicant's inability to perform compe-
tently or safely. Such documentation should consist of job-specific
medical evaluations and facts, not assumptions, regarding compe-
tence or safety.243 This approach leaves room for effective, job-re-
lated employer action despite the inherent confusion contained in
the various statutes.
C. Potential Liability Under Common Law Tort Theories
1. Defamation
A "common law tort" is simply a civil wrong for which the
judiciary rather than the legislature has created a remedy. 2" Em-
241. Id. at § 1026.
242. Id. at § 1028. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 98-98.7 (West Supp. 1986) for the proce-
dures the Labor Commissioner follows in dealing with complaints. Although the Labor
Commissioner's office has not determined how many rehabilitation treatments an individual
must be afforded, there is some indication that multiple "revolving door" treatments will not
be tolerated. BNA DAILY LABOR REP'T, No. 64 (April 3, 1985), p. A-3 to A-4. If these
treatments are paid for by the employer, the employee health insurance policy or plan should
be reviewed to determine the number of treatments covered.
243. Courts typically have shown more deference to employer decisions when public
safety is involved. See, eg., OFCCP v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (AiU Decision, U.S. Dept. of
Labor), BNA DAILY LABOR REP'T, No. 80 (April 25, 1983), p. A-1 (amputee who walked
with prosthetic leg not qualified to resume duties as railroad engineer since 4% of job duties
required considerable walking, sometimes in rough terrain, to flag approaching trains in
emergencies and to check train conditions, etc.)
244. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (5th ed. 1979). Not all the potential
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ployers should keep in mind potential tort issues as well as statutory
rules when developing drug and alcohol programs. While a full
analysis of tort law is beyond the scope of this article, a brief discus-
sion of the major areas of concern follows.
Under the common law tort of defamation, an employer may
be liable for communicating false information about an employee to
a third party if the information is injurious to the business or per-
sonal reputation of the employee.245 In the drug and alcohol con-
text, defamation claims will most likely arise if an employer (1)
investigates an employee and shares its findings or suspicions with
third parties including other employees who have no need to know,
particularly if the findings are wrong or unreliable, or (2) explains
to third parties the reason for any adverse action it takes against an
employee, particularly if the third party is a prospective
employer.246
Employers in California, however, may defend some claims of
defamation with a statutory privilege. One such privilege applies to
an official who communicates information relating to employee mis-
conduct or breach of responsibility in order to take appropriate ac-
tion against the employee or minimize the misconceptions of
present employees concerning their own past conduct.247 Thus,
even though a disclosure may result in emotional distress to the af-
fected employee, courts are willing to protect the right of company
officials to make good faith statements to protect the employer's
economic self-interest. 248 This privilege may be lost if the statement
is false and not made in good faith or is made to individuals who do
not have a legitimate need to know the information. Therefore,
tort theories are listed here. For example, a claim of emotional distress often accompanies
claims based on other theories. See, eg., supra note 151.
245. See, eg., Semple v. Andrews, 27 Cal. App. 2d 228, 81 P.2d 203 (1938).
246. See, eg., O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of America, Inc., 780 F.2d 1067 (Ist Cir. 1986)
(defamation award of $50,000 against employer who discharged an employee who reportedly
failed a polygraph question about the use of cocaine); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v.
Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1977) (jury awarded $150,000 in compensatory
damages and $50,000 punitive damages against employer and two managers who reported
that the discharged plaintiff's drug test contained methadone when in fact the sample had
contained a chemical similar to methadone).
247. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West 1983):
A privileged publication or broadcast is one made... 3. In a communication,
without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is interested, or
(2) by one who stands in such relation to the person interested as to afford a
reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication innocent,
or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information.
248. See, eg., Williams v. Taylor, 129 Cal. App. 3d 745, 752, 181 Cal. Rptr. 423, 427
(1982).
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even though truth is a defense to defamation claims, errors are often
made in the fact gathering process. Thus, exposure to possible defa-
mation claims is a real possibility if communications are not care-
fully limited both outside and inside company.
Another statutory defense, which merely codifies common-
sense principles and well-recognized case law, is that the employer
gave truthful information concerning the reasons for an employee's
discharge or voluntary termination.249 While truthful statements
are defensible, an employer must go to great effort and expense to
prove the statements are true. And if the reasons for termination
involve drug or alcohol use, abuse or sale, such proof may be diffi-
cult to marshal. The wisest policy, then, is to drastically limit the
comments made to third parties, particularly prospective employ-
ers, and to issue no information without a signed release by the af-
fected employee.2
2. Negligent Hiring and/or Retention of Employees
There exists an emerging but solid line of cases holding em-
ployers directly responsible for failing to use care in screening appli-
cants, in hiring or in supervising and/or retaining incompetent or
249. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1053 (West 1971) reads:
Nothing in this chapter shall prevent an employer or an agent, employee,
superintendent or manager thereof from furnishing, upon special request there-
for, a truthful statement concerning the reason for the discharge of an em-
ployee or why an employee voluntarily left the service of the employer. If such
statement furnishes any mark, sign, or other means conveying information dif-
ferent from that expressed by words therein, such fact, or the fact that such
statement or other means of furnishing information was given without a special
request therefore is prima facie evidence of a violation of sections 1050 to 1053.
See also Pond v. Gen. Elec. Co., 256 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1958), cerL denied, 358 U.S. 818
(1958) (the court held that a statement by a former employer as to the qualifications of former
employee in response to an inquiry by a potential employer is qualifiedly privileged); Williams
v. Taylor, 129 Cal. App. 3d 745, 181 CaL.Rptr. 423 (1982) (in an action for slander by a
former manager of an autobody shop against company officials, the court held that state-
ments by the company president to the police concerning the manager's suspected criminal
activities were absolutely privileged under § 47(3)). See also Deaile v. Gen. Tel. Co., 40 Cal.
App. 3d 841, 115 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1974) (applying CAL. CIv. CODE § 47); but cf. CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1050 (West 1971) ("any person, or agent or officer thereof, who, after having dis-
charged an employee from service of such person or after having paid off an employee volun-
tarily leaving such service, by any misrepresentation prevents an attempts to prevent the
former employee from obtaining employment, is guilty of a misdemeanor").
250. See generally, R. BAXTER & G. SINISCALCO., MANAGER'S GUIDE To LAWFUL
TERMINATIONS 105-7 (Executive Enterprises 1983). See A.J. Meyers & Co. v. Los Angeles
County Probation Dep't, 78 Cal. App. 3d 309, 144 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1978); H.R. Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928) (former employers were held liable
for damages for misleading prospective employers about an employee).
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dangerous employees.251 Since the behavior of drug an alcohol
abusers can present serious problems to co-workers and others, an
employer must pay particular attention to any sign that an appli-
cant or current employee may present such a danger. Failure to act
reasonably when such information was available or could have been
available can certainly expose an employer to substantial liability.2 52
Even absent evidence of negligent screening or supervision, an
employer may be held vicariously liable for the negligent and/or
violent acts of an employee.253 When an employee commits a delib-
erate and willful tort, an employer will be more likely to be found
liable if the act had some connection with the employment, such as
furthering the interest of the employer's business, rather than if the
employee is engaging in personal malice.254
Taking those principles one step further, the California
Supreme Court has held that one who holds a special relationship
either to a potential perpetrator or potential victim of dangerous
action may have a duty to warn the victim.255 This duty has not yet
been extended to employers who learn that an employee has danger-
ous proclivities yet fail to warn those outside of the employer's
workplace, but likely will if current trends continue. In particular
251. See Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307 (rex. 1983) (wrongful death action
against employer permitted when supervisor sent a seemingly intoxicated employee home and
employee caused automobile accident killing two people); Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor
Co., 264 Cal. App. 2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1983) (cause of action for automobile injury
permitted against employer when employee left prolonged company Christmas party intoxi-
cated and caused accident). See also Welsh Mfg. v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 474 A. 2d 436 (R.I.
Supr. Ct. 1984) (holding an employer liable for theft by security guard because of negligent
pre-employment screening and failure to adequately train and supervise in light of suspicion
that employee had "sticky fingers"); Gaines v. Monsanto Co., 655 S.W. 2d 568 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983) (holding that an employer can be held liable for murder by one employee of another on
a theory of negligent hiring and supervision of an employee; the employee had been previ-
ously convicted of rape and robbery and his assignments required him to circulate among
employer's female employees); Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 263 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir.
1956) (landlord was held liable for death of tenant murdered by employee hired without
adequate pre-employment investigation). A few federal courts have also allowed employees
to recover damages for negligent and inaccurate maintenance of personnel records. See Qui-
nones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269 (3d Cir. 1974); Bulkin v. Wester Kraft East, Inc., 422
F. Supp. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
252. Gaines v. Monsanto Co., 655 S.W. 2d 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (not only was em-
ployer aware of employee's former convictions of rape and robbery, but it had received nu-
merous complaints from other employees concerning the individual's behavior.)
253. See, eg., Coats v. Constr. & Gen. Laborers Local No. 185, 15 Cal. App. 3d 908, 93
Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971) (holding a union liable for damages for an assault by its agents in labor
dispute).
254. Id. at 193.
255. See Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976) (treating psychiatrist had duty to warn potential murder victim).
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the issue might be presented if an employer's reference is requested
regarding a current or former employee.
The potential liability and work disruptions facing employers
dictate that they formulate a comprehensive drug and alcohol pol-
icy to deal with employees who are suspected of drug use. Since
employees intoxicated by drugs may be more of a hazard to others
or even more violent, the potential liability is compounded. Conse-
quently, in order to guard against such liability, an employer sus-
pecting drug usage by employees must act quickly and reasonably
as dictated by the particular circumstances.
3. False Imprisonment
False imprisonment is a tort that is broadly defined as "the
unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another. 2 56 False im-
prisonment occurs when an individual is restricted by an unlawful
assertion of authority or physical restraint from leaving a room or
area.257 Since interrogation sessions can lead to claims of false im-
prisonment, an employer should question an employee about drug
or alcohol use, possession or sale only if the employee truly consents
to the discussion and is otherwise free to leave the company
premises.
4. False Arrest
A private citizen may lawfully make a citizen's arrest and de-
tain an individual until police arrive only if: the arrestee committed
a misdemeanor in his or her presence; or committed a felony
whether or not in his or her presence; or there is reasonable cause to
believe that the arrestee has committed a felony.2"8 If a citizen's
arrest is unlawfully made, a civil damage action for false arrest or
false imprisonment may be brought by the arrestee.2"9
An individual who is "under the influence" of most controlled
substances is guilty of a misdemeanor.260 However, marijuana con-
256. See Newport Beach v. Sasse, 9 Cal. App. 3d 803, 88 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1970); Parrott
v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 97 Cal. App. 2d 14, 217 P.2d 89 (1950) (plain-
tiff recovered damages of $30,000 after showing that her employer interrogated her for three
hours and threatened criminal prosecution unless she confessed to misappropriating a de-
posit); Moffatt v. Buffums', Inc., 21 Cal. App. 2d 371, 69 P.2d 424 (1937) (action for false
imprisonment where an employer kept the plaintiff in an office for five hours to extract a
confession that she had stolen money from the company).
257. See supra note 256 and accomanying text.
258. CAL. PENAL CODE § 837 (West 1982).
259. Muller v. Reagh, 215 Cal. App. 2d 831, 30 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1963).
260. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11054-55 (West 1982).
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stitutes an exception to this rule.26 1 As a result, an employer can
make a lawful citizen's arrest of an employee who is seriously im-
paired by a listed drug other than marijuana or alcohol. Employers
should limit such arrests to situations where safety and security
warrant detention pending police arrival. Since criminal prosecu-
tion solely for being "under the influence" may be unlikely except in
aggravated circumstances, the employer should make an arrest only
after careful deliberation.262
5. Wrongful Discharge
A complete discussion of the emerging law of wrongful termi-
nation is beyond the scope of this article.263 However, to avoid lia-
bility for wrongfully discharging an employee as a result of an
investigation or search, an employer must act reasonably in light of
the specific constitutional, statutory and common law provisions set
forth in this Article.
Similarly, in most jurisdictions an employer who discharges or
disciplines an employee for suspected or proven drug use or abuse
should act reasonably in light of stated personnel policies and the
employee's work record in order to avoid liability. The employer
must follow its own termination procedures when dealing with an
employee suspected of illegal drug use or abuse in the workplace, as
it would when terminating an employee for any other reason.
Employer discipline of an employee's refusal to undergo drug
tests represents a particularly troublesome problem in states such as
California. An employee who has been disciplined or discharged
cannot logically claim that a violation of privacy rights has oc-
curred if he or she refused to be tested. Such an employee can
claim, however, that the testing program violates the public policy
derived from California's constitutional right of privacy and related
statutory privileges on the ground that to have submitted to the
testing as requested or required would have violated his or her con-
stitutional or statutory rights.2 4
A public policy argument depends upon proving an underlying
privacy or statutory violation that would have resulted from opera-
261. Id.
262. Cervantez v. J. C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 156 Cal. Rptr. 198, 595 P.2d 975
(1979). The Cervantez court noted that a private citizen may arrest another for a misde-
meanor only if the offense was committed in his presence. Further, in a false imprisonment/
arrest case the burden of proving the legality of the arrest is on the defendant. See also People
v. Lee, 157 Cal. App. 3d 9, 204 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1984).
263. See generally R. BAXTER & G. SINISCALCO, supra note 250.
264. See supra notes 59-78 and accomanying text,
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tion of the testing program. A program that is reasonably linked to
workplace needs and is communicated in advance to employees
ought not to cause such a violation, even if testing is required. Of
course, no drug detection program can survive without providing
some consequence for refusal to undergo testing. If employees who
expect to test positive for drug use could escape testing that is rea-
sonably work related, the strong public policy in favor of reducing
employee drug use would be neutralized.
Presuming that employees can either consent to preannounced
testing policies as a condition of employment or can resign in lieu of
testing, there can never actually be a constitutional privacy viola-
tion. The courts ought not to bootstrap a constitutional or public
policy violation from an event that can never occur, absent forcible
administration of testing. Nevertheless, employers should be mind-
ful that this is an unsettled issue of law. It depends for its resolution
upon how a particular judge chooses to balance the complex pri-
vacy interests of employees against the employer and public inter-
ests in reducing workplace drug abuse and employee impairment.265
V. DISCIPLINING EMPLOYEES FOR DRUG AND ALCOHOL
OFFENSES
Most employers who reasonably suspect or confirm job-related
abuse of drugs or alcohol want to take some type of action. What
action they choose should depend on previously communicated pol-
icies and practices tailored to their specific work environment. In
turn, the employee-relations success and legal liability of those ac-
tions will depend upon whether those policies and practices are con-
sidered reasonable under the circumstances and whether in fact
they were followed.
A. Formulating a Disciplinary Approach
Work environments, styles and needs vary significantly from
265. Related torts that may be claimed by aggrieved employees include assault, battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and trespass to chattels. Assault is "an unlawful
attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 240. (West 1970). Battery is "any willful and unlawful use of force or
violence upon the person of another." Id. Intentional infliction of emotional distress may be
claimed if an employer engages in outrageous conduct with the intention and effect of causing
severe emotional suffering to an employee. Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579,
593, 156 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1979); Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141
(1979). See also Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'l Bank, 363 N.W. 2d 108 (Minn. 1985). Trespass
to chattels is committed when one interferes with the personal property of another. See, e.g.,
Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1969); see also PROSSER, LAW
OF ToRis § 14 (4th ed. 1971).
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one employer to another. Consequently, disciplinary measures vary
accordingly.266 Some employers may decide employees suspected
drug or alcohol use or abuse must be terminated regardless of any
potential for rehabilitation. At the opposite extreme, an employer
may offer all such employees therapeutic or medical treatment with
no disciplinary action whatsoever. Most employers, however, favor
a flexible approach that permits treatment within a framework of
discipline.
As a general matter, restrictive laws affect employers the least
when the discipline relates to absenteeism, unacceptable perform-
ance or safety violations. Employers are accorded particularly wide
latitude if health or safety is at issue. Since drug and alcohol use is
commonly linked to increased hazards on the job, employers will
have more freedom to discipline employees if the affected jobs in-
volve safety risks to coworkers or the public, such as jobs related to
publi utilities, transportation or involving machinery.
1. Drug and Alcohol Policies Should be
Communicated in Writing
Any drug eradication program should begin with a clear and
reasonable policy effectively communicated to all employees and su-
pervisors. All procedures and potential discipline for drug or alco-
hol infractions should appear prominently in the employer's
personnel manual, and should be disseminated to all employees. If
the employer has no formal manual, the same information should
be communicated by written notice, memorandum or bulletin. In
particular, the policy should cover all illegal drugs, including "fash-
ionable" drugs such as marijuana and cocaine. Similarly, the policy
should cover abuse of prescribed medications and alcohol.
Employers may amend written policies as circumstances
change or the need arises. Those amendments, however, should be
communicated to all employees and supervisors. Above all, once a
policy is in place or unwritten practice established employers should
follow it. Any deviation, particularly a significant one, may result
in liability, particularly for a breach of contractual obligation.267
266. See generally T. Denenberg & R. Denenberg, Alcohol and Drugs: Issues in the
Workplace 3-4 (BNA, 1983) (describing three approaches to employee discipline programs:
(1) pure discipline; (2) the therapuetic approach; and (3) the flexible intermediate approach).
267. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., I1I Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980) (holding that an employee who had been employed for 18 years of satisfactory per-
formance and was discharged without a hearing contrary to employer's procedures for adju-
dicating disputes stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge). See also Hillsman v. Sutter
Community Hosp., 153 Cal. App. 3d 743, 200 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1984); Rulon-Miller v. Int'l
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2. Considering a Rehabilitative Option
Increasingly, employers are adopting some form of employee
assistance program(EAP). Employers find that providing a rehabil-
itative treatment plan can salvage an employee whose performance
is deteriorating but is not unacceptable or irremediable.26 8
The exact nature of the assistance provided varies considera-
bly. Some employers offer confidential counseling and/or referral
services through independent counseling firms.26 9 Other provide in-
house services or simply offer employer-sponsored health insurance
that covers rehabilitation program.
If an EAP of some type is offered, participation by the affected
employee should not be made mandatory. Moreover, work per-
formance should be judged separately from EAP participation,
although such participation can be considered as a positive sign of
an employee's willingness to work through personal problems.
Although no employer is obligated to offer an EAP, California
employers should recall the legal obligation to reasonably accom-
modate persons who enter alcoholic rehabilitation programs.270
Employers also should train supervisors to intervene when
work performance first becomes noticeably affected, even if the
cause is not positively known to be drug or alcohol related. Once
an employer has tolerated marginal or unacceptable behavior for a
period of time without any action, it is often more difficult to deal
with and is more likely to worsen rather than improve. If the em-
ployee's conduct or performance does not warrant termination, the
employer should thoroughly document the situation and institute a
treatment and/or corrective discipline approach.
Bus. Mach., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984), modified, 162 Cal. App. 3d
1181b (1984). An employer can attempt to limit liability for contractual obligations created
by its written policies by including disclaimers. See R. BAXTER & G. SINISCALCO, supra note
250; Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1983).
See Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1982); Hepp v. Lock-
heed-California Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1978). See generally Baxter &
Wohl, A Special Update: Wrongful Termination Tort Claims, 11 EmP. REL. L.J. 124 (1985).
268. Two recent surveys by Human Resources Group, Inc., a New York-based firm that
develops and administers EAP's, indicate that drug and alcohol addictions constituted 14%
of EAP usage in 1983 and 15% in 1984. In both years drug and alcohol addictions were the
third most common reason for use of the EAP, behind psychological problems and legal
problems. BNA DAILY LABOR REP'T, No. 27 (Feb. 8, 1985), p. A-6. See generally Delaney,
Opportunities and Challenges Facing EAPs, in BNA SPECIAL REPORT, ALCOHOL & DRUGS,
supra note 1, at 129.
269. A formal contract should spell out the desired services and provide indemnification
for the employer against lawsuits arising from employee use of an independent EAP provider.
270. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1025-28 (West Supp. 1986).
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B. Supervisors Play a Key Role
Employers should not require that supervisors act as diagnosti-
cians. Supervisors should concentrate on employee work perform-
ance. Their sensitivity to an employee's personal problems as they
counsel or train the employee for better performance should be suf-
ficient. And, if possible drug or alcohol problems are identified, the
supervisor should refer the matter to trained personnel of employee
assistance officials.
On the other hand, supervisors should be trained to identify
the signs of drug and alcohol use. Such training is important both
for purposes of employee rehabilitation and to minimize the likeli-
hood that drug usage will spread. Typical signs of drug or alcohol
use can be patterns of absences (especially periodic absences of sev-
eral consecutive days), chronic tardiness or early departure, accu-
mulations of excessive sick leave, accidents which result in personal
injury or damage to equipment, theft and misrepresentations.27'
Supervisors should keep records of such problems and review those
records for possible patterns.
Clear and explicit personnel policies should govern each step of
the investigation, discipline and termination process. Every super-
visor should be thoroughly familiar with those procedures. Drug or
alcohol use, sale or intoxication is often proved by circumstantial
evidence. Usually there is little or no direct evidence unless drug
testing has been performed. Nonetheless, employers should base
decisions to terminate employees on objective evidence, not mere
unconfirmed suspicions. Depending on the circumstances, the su-
pervisor may send an offending employee home until an investiga-
tion can confirm the essential facts to support a later decision to
suspend or terminate. If it appears that the supervisor or other em-
ployees may be in physical danger due to drug or alcohol-related
activity, security personnel or the police should be called at once.
Supervisors must be made to feel that their efforts to halt drug or
alcohol offenses will be supported by management and that any
threats to their personal safety or property will be dealt with swiftly.
Thus, good personnel practice dictates that termination be specified
as the consequence of intimidation or threats of physical abuse by
any employee against supervisors or fellow employees.
An employer should handle any termination for drug or alco-
hol related offenses in the same reasonable manner as other termi-
271. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text. See also supra note 69 and accompany-
ing text.
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nations. 2  In brief, the personnel manager (or equivalent) should
review the facts for objectivity and to ensure proper procedures
have been followed and consistent discipline applied. In particular,
employers should not allow a double standard in which executives
are not subject to anti-drug and alcohol policies, while other em-
ployees are subject to discipline or discharge. Many experts con-
sider executives and management employees among the best
candidates for alcohol rehabilitation programs if the problems are
recognized at an early stage, although "success" rates are reason-
ably high for blue collar workers as well. A checklist of procedures
can be useful to review with legal counsel.
In that way, an employer may ensure consistent company pro-
cedures and practices and may minimize mistakes (especially when
numerous managers are permitted to make termination recommen-
dations). Indeed, if legal counsel is involved in the investigation it is
possible to protect the confidentiality of the process and documenta-
tion through use of the attorney-client privilege or work-product
doctrine.273
An employer always should provide an employee under inves-
tigation with a full opportunity to be heard on the subject. It is also
advisable to interview the affected employee to determine the nature
and substance of any potential claims the employee may make and
to clarify any misunderstandings. This interview should be docu-
mented with a file memorandum made immediately afterward.
In sum, sensitive or important business functions should not be
in the hands of drug or alcohol abusers. While employers may han-
dle minor and isolated infractions through counseling and disci-
pline, recurrent or substantial employee drug or alcohol problems
(particularly at the management level) may lead to costly mistakes,
theft, embezzlement or other actions that are destructive to a busi-
ness enterprise. Thus, strong disciplinary action, including termina-
tion, may be required and can be accomplished with minimal legal
risk so long as the action is based on fair and reasonable policies
that have been communicated and followed fairly and in good faith.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has broadly surveyed the many diverse areas of law
that impact upon employee drug testing and investigations. The ex-
272. See generally R. BAXTER & G. SINISCALCO, supra note 250.
273. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Supe-
rior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388 P.2d 700 (1964). Caution should be exercised, however,
because the attorney could become a material witness.
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isting legal restrictions are not part of a coherent body of law solely
applicable to drug testing. Instead, the restrictions come from vir-
tually every area in the field of labor and employment law as well as
from general privacy statutes and constitutional provisions.
Employee drug testing and modem techniques of investigation
are a recent employer response to the problem of drug use and sale
in the workplace. Most of these policies and programs are logical
extensions of well-accepted employer practices regulating employee
safety, behavior and work performance. On the other hand, the
uses and limitations of such sophisticated testing technology are
typically misunderstood by employers, employees and the public.
As a result, the issue of drug and alcohol detection has generated
emotional responses but little thoughtful analysis.
This lack of understanding has led to confusion among em-
ployers over how to handle the problem, and inconsistencies in the
early court decisions and legislative inititiatives concerning the pro-
priety of particular testing programs. Consequently, the legality of
various detection procedures and methods may be uncertain as em-
ployers await further judicial and legislative developments. This
uncertainty poses some risk of liability to an employer who adopts
such detection programs.
Nevertheless, drug and alcohol detection programs that are
reasonably based upon legitimate workplace needs ultimately
should be upheld as lawful and in the public interest. Employers
willing to endure the legal and technical complexities involved in
implementing detection programs can expect to increase productiv-
ity and reduce theft, absenteeism, workers compensation claims and
accidents. Such a result benefits employer, employee and society as
a whore.
Employers, however, should develop any drug or alcohol pro-
grams with considerable care and planning. First, an employer's
policy should be reasonably calculated to meet actual and signifi-
cant workplace needs. Second, an employer should obtain em-
ployee(or union) support for the program by explaining procedures,
purposes and benefits and soliciting suggestions. Third, an em-
ployer should provide ample advance notice of the implementation
of the program. Fourth, an employer should strive for fairness and
accuracy in employee selection and testing methods as well as in
other investigative techniques. Finally each employer should con-
sider the full range of rehabilitative and disciplinary alternatives
when confronted with employee violations of the drug and alcohol
policies. A more humane approach to rehabilitation and discipline
[Vol. 2
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can add to the reasonableness of a testing and investigation program
and preserve an employer's investment in a valuable company re-
source, its employees.
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APPENDIX A
ORDINANCE NO. 527-85 (1985), ART. 33A,
amending PART II, CHAPTER VIII
SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL CODE (POLICE
CODE)
The ordinance reads as follows:
SECTION 3300A.5 EMPLOYER PROHIBITED FROM
TESTING OF EMPLOYEE. No employer may demand, require,
or request employees to submit to, to take or to undergo any blood,
urine, or encephalographic test in the body as a condition of contin-
ued employment. Nothing herein shall prohibit an employer from
requiring a specific employee to submit to blood or urine testing if:
(a) the employer has reasonable grounds to believe that an em-
ployee's faculties are impaired on the job; and
(b) the employee is in a position where such impairment
presents a clear and present danger to the physical safety of the
employee, another employee or to a member of the public; and
(c) the employer provides the employee, at the employer's ex-
pense, the opportunity to have the sample tested or evaluated by
State licensed independent laboratory/testing facility and provides
the employee with a reasonable opportunity to rebut or explain the
results.
In conducting those tests designed to identify the presence of
chemical substances in the body, and not prohibited by this section,
the employer shall ensure to the extent feasible that the test only
measure and that its records only show or make use of information
regarding chemical substances which are likely to affect the ability
of the employee to perform safely his or her duties while on the job.
Under no circumstances may employers request, require or conduct
random or company-wide blood, urine or encephalographic testing.
In any action brought under this Article alleging that the em-
ployer had violated this section, the employer shall have the burden
of proving that the requirements of Subsections (a), (b) and (c) as
stated above have been satisfied.
SECTION 3300A.6 MEDICAL SCREENING FOR EXPO-
SURE TO TOXIC SUBSTANCES. Nothing in this article shall
prevent any employer from conducting medical screening, with the
express written consent of the employees, to monitor exposure to
toxic or other unhealthy substances in the workplace or in the per-
formance of their job responsibilities. Any such screenings or tests
must be limited to the specific substances expressly identified in the
employee consent form.
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SECTION 3300A.7 PROHIBITING USE OF INTOXICAT-
ING SUBSTANCES DURING WORKING HOURS; DISCI-
PLINE FOR BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
INTOXICATING SUBSTANCES DURING WORKING
HOURS. Nothing in this Article shall restrict an employer's abil-
ity to prohibit the use of intoxicating substances during work hours,
or restrict an employer's ability to discipline employees for being
under the influence of intoxicating substances during work hours.
SECTION 3300A.8 ENFORCEMENT. (a) Any aggrieved
person may enforce the provisions of this Article my means of a
civil action. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this
Article or who aids in the violation of this Article shall be liable to
the person aggrieved for special and general damages, together with
attorney's fees and the costs of action.
(b) Injunction.
(1) Any person who commits, or proposes to commit, an act
in violation of this Article may be enjoined therefrom by any court
of competent jurisdiction.
(2) An action for injunctive relief under this subsection may
be brought by any aggrieved person, by the District Attorney, or by
the City Attorney, or by any person or entity which will fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the protected class.
SECTION 3300A.9 CITY UNDERTAKING LIMITED TO
PROMOTION OF GENERAL WELFARE. In undertaking the
adoption and enforcement of this ordinance, the City and County is
assuming an undertaking only to promote the general welfare. It is
not assuming, nor is it imposing on its officers and employees, an
obligation for breach of which it is liable in money damages to any
person who claims that such breach proximately caused injury.
SECTION 3300A. 10 PREEMPTION. In adopting this Arti-
cle, the Board of Supervisors does not intend to regulate or affect
the rights or authority of an employer to do those things that are
required, directed, or expressly authorized by federal or state law or
administrative regulation or by a collective bargaining agreement
between an employer and an employee labor organization. Further,
in adopting this Article, the Board of Supervisors does not intend to
prohibit that which is prohibited by federal or state law or adminis-
trative regulation or by a collective bargaining agreement between
an employer and an employee labor organization.
SECTION 3300A. 11 SEVERABILITY. If any part or provi-
sion of this Article, or the application thereof to any person or cir-
cumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this Article, including
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the application of such part or provision to other persons or circum-
stances, shall not be affected thereby and shall continue in full force
and effect. To this end, provisions of this Article are severable.
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APPENDIX B
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL 1482
SECTION 1. Section 432.4 is added to the Labor Code, to
read:
432.4. (a) Every private employer shall inform all employees
and applicants for employment of the employer's policy regarding
drug use and medical testing of employees to detect the presence of
drugs.
(b) Every employee shall receive advance notice that medical
testing to detect the presence of drugs may be a routine part of his
or her employment before the employer may require medical testing
of employees to detect the presence of drugs.
(c) Each employee has the right to choose his or her own
physician, laboratory, clinic, or hospital to administer medical tests
to detect the presence of drugs. The costs of the testing are the
responsibility of the employer.
(d) The medical tests to detect the presence of drugs shall be
administered within 48 hours after the employer request an em-
ployee to take the tests.
(e) Any employer who violates this section is guilty of a mis-
demeanor punishable by a fine of five hundred dollars ($500).
SECTION 2. No reimbursement is required by this act pursu-
ant to Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution
because the only costs which may be incurred by a local agency or
school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime
or infraction, changes the definition of a crime or infraction,
changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, or eliminates a crime
or infraction.
SECTION 5. Section 1027 of the Labor Code is amended to
read:
1027. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require an
employer to provide time off with pay, except that an employee may
use sick leave to which he or she is entitled for the purpose of enter-
ing and participating in an alcohol or drug rehabilitation program.
SECTION 6. Reimbursement to local agencies and school dis-
tricts for costs mandated by the state pursuant to this act shall be
made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Divi-
sion 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code and, if the statewide cost
of the claim for reimbursement does not exceed five hundred thou-
sand dollars ($500,000), shall be made from the State Mandates
Claims Fund.
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APPENDIX C
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL 4242
SECTION 2. Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 11998) is
added to Part 5 of Division 10.5 of the Health and Safety Code, to
read:
CHAPTER 5. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TESTING
11998. This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the
"Substance Abuse Testing Act of 1986."
11998.1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the
following:
(a) Employers are increasingly using substance abuse testing
to screen job applicants and employees.
(b) The Centers for Disease Control report finds that some of
these tests may not be conducted properly. In a 1985 study, the
CDC found "serious shortcomings" in the quality controls of test-
ing laboratories.
(c) Licensure of the state's laboratories which test on behalf of
employers will balance the rights of employees with adequate pro-
tection for the public. Reducing illicit drug use in the workplace
will improve the safety, health, and productivity of all Californians.
11998.2. If an employer requests or requires a job applicant or
an employee to submit to a substance abuse test of any type, the
employer shall use a clinical laboratory licensed by the State De-
partment of Health Services under Chapter 3 (commencing with
Section 1200) of Division 2 of the Business and Professions Code or
a public health laboratory certified by the state department under
Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 100 ) of Division 1.
11998.3. Notwithstanding any negotiated collective bargaining
agreement between an employer and his or her employees which
provides for additional substance abuse testing standards, employ-
ers shall inform employees and job applicants of the testing policies
in writing upon the adoption of the policy or when the employee is
hired, if the policy was previously adopted. An employee shall have
the right to request a copy of the results of a substance abuse test
conducted pursuant to this chapter.
11998.4. Employers, employees, and laboratories shall keep all
samples and test results confidential in compliance with the Infor-
mation Practices Act of 1977 provided for the Chapter 1 (com-
mencing with Section 1798) of Title 1.8 of Part 4 of the Civil Code
and the California Public Records Act provided for in Chapter 3.5
(commencing with Section 6250) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Gov-
ernment Code.
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1198.5. This chapter shall apply to private employers and to
state and local entities of government.
SEC. 3. The heading of Chapter 3.7 (commencing with Sec-
tion 1025) of Part 3 of Division 2 of the Labor Code is amended to
read:
CHAPTER 3.7. ALCOHOL AND DRUG REHABILITATION
SEC. 4. Section 1025 of the Labor Code is amended to read:
1025. Every public and private employer regularly employing
25 or more employees shall reasonably accommodate any employee
who wishes to voluntarily enter and participate in an alcohol or
drug rehabilitation program, provided that this reasonable accom-
modation does not impose an undue hardship on the employer.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit an em-
ployer from refusing to hire, or discharging an employee who, be-
cause of the employee's current use of alcohol or drugs, is unable to
perform his or her duties, or cannot perform the duties in a manner
which would not endanger his or her health or safety or the health
or safety of others.
SEC. 5. Section 1026 of the Labor Code is amended to read:
1026. The employer shall make reasonable efforts to safeguard
the privacy of the employee as to the fact that he or she has enrolled
in an alcohol or drug rehabilitation program.
SEC. 6. Section 1027 of the Labor Code is amended to read:
1027. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require an
employer to do either of the following:
(a) Provide time off with pay, except that an employee may
use sick leave to which he or she is entitled for the purpose of enter-
ing and participating in an alcohol or drug rehabilitation program.
(b) Pay for the cost of an alcohol or drug rehabilitation
program.
SEC. 7. No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to
Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution because
this act does not mandate a new program or higher level of service
on local government. It is recognized, however, that a local agency
or school district may pursue any remedies to obtain reimbursement
available to it under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 17550) of
Part 7 of Division 2 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
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APPENDIX D
CALIFORNIA SENATE BILL 2175
SECTION 1. An employer shall have the right to request or
require an employee, as a condition of continued employment, to
submit to or undergo a blood, urine, breath or other chemical test to
determine the presence in the body of alcohol or controlled sub-
stances, in any of the following circumstances:
(a) whenever the employer has a reasonable suspicion that an
employee or group of employees is, or may be, impaired or affected
on the job by alcohol or controlled substances; or
(b) whenever the employer has a reasonable suspicion that con-
trolled substances are present in an employee's bodily system in vio-
lation of the employer's published rules or policy;
(c) whenever an employee has been involved in a work-related
accident causing bodily injury or damage to property, however
minor;
(d) as part of a physical examination which the employer,
under its established policies, requires employees to undergo an a
regular or periodic basis, or as a result of specified occurrences,
such as declining performance or absenteeism, so long as employees
are notified in advance that the examination will include testing for
alcohol or controlled substances;
(e) in accordance with the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement between the employer and the bargaining representative
of its employees, or a written employment agreement between an
employer and an employee;
(f) as part of the employer's program of rehabilitation or em-
ployee assistance;
(g) whenever an employee has tested positively for the presence
of alcohol or illegal, controlled substances within the prior 12-
month period; or
(h) as may be required or authorized by any federal or state
health, safety or other law or regulation.
SECTION 2. In addition to the circumstances set forth in Sec-
tion 1 above, an employer may conduct testing of employees, in-
cluding random, on-the-spot or company-wide testing:
(a) once in any 12-month period, regardless of the employees'
job classification, or
(b) up to three times in any 12-month period in the case of
employees whose jobs involve the operation of vehicles in public
transit, operation of heavy construction or off-shore oil drilling
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equipment, the handling of hazardous substances, or any job in
which impairment due to controlled substances would present a
safety hazard to employees or members of the public; provided,
however, that before testing of an employee may be conducted pur-
suant to this section, the employer must have advised the employee,
in advance, of its policy that such testing may be required.
SECTION 3. Nothing in this Chapter shall prohibit an em-
ployer, or an agent thereof, from requiring an applicant for employ-
ment to undergo a blood, urine or other chemical test to determine
the presence in the body of alcohol or controlled substances.
SECTION 4. Employers who conduct testing pursuant to this
chapter shall take reasonable precautions to ensure the confidential-
ity of the test results. Employers shall also ensure that such sub-
stance abuse testing is not used for any other purpose, such as
testing for pregnancy, presence of AIDS antibodies or other medical
or bodily conditions.
SECTION 5. It is the Legislature's intention to occupy the
field of regulation of substance abuse testing in employment encom-
passed by the provisions of this chapter, exclusive of all other laws
regulating such testing in employment by any city, county, city and
county, or other political subdivisions of this state. This chapter
shall preempt and take precedence over any local ordinance, law or
regulation, in the event of any conflict between such local provision
and the provisions of this chapter.
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APPENDIX E
SAMPLE GUIDELINES FOR EMPLOYEE SEARCHES
The following is an example of a company policy issued to su-
pervisory personnel that incorporates the suggestions made in the
Article. It is meant to be illustrative only and should be carefully
adapted to reflect each individual employer's needs.
GUIDELINES FOR EMPLOYEE SEARCHES
CONCERNING STOLEN GOODS OR
PROHIBITED MATERIALS
The following guidelines should be observed by all supervisory
personnel when they consider searching employees for possession of
either (1) stolen goods or (2) prohibited materials such as alcohol or
drugs.
These guidelines apply not only to searches of an employee's
person, but also to searches of an employee's personal effects (such
as lunch pails, purses, and automobiles) and equipment he or she
uses that is supplied by the Company (such as lockers, tool boxes,
and trucks).
These guidelines have been published for supervisory use only.
They do not establish new rules for employees. Instead, they
merely clarify the steps and precautions that supervisory personnel
should take in enforcing our long-standing policies of employee
conduct.
1. "Reasonable Cause"
Employee searches should be conducted only if there is reason-
able cause to believe that the employee has stolen property or pro-
hibited material in his possession.
You should search an employee (or his or her effects) only if
you have reasonable cause to believe he or she is, at the time of the
search, in possession of stolen property or prohibited materials.
"Reasonable cause" means that, on balance, in light of all the facts
you know, you have more reason to think the employee possesses
the article than you have reason to think he or she does not. "Rea-
sonable cause" does not mean that there is no doubt about the em-
ployee's guilt, but it means more than just a suspicion of
misconduct.
There is no one type of evidence that will satisfy the require-
ment of reasonable cause. Obviously, the best evidence is person-
ally observing the employee taking Company property, or being in
possession of contraband. There are, however, other ways you can
have reasonable cause to believe the employee. Another worker
(whom you know to be reliable) may tell you he or she saw the
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employee taking Company property. Or the employee may have a
strong odor of alcohol on his breath or marijuana on his person. Or
you may observe a pattern of items that belong to the Company
disappearing after the employee has used them.
You may also have some suspicions but remain unsure. If pos-
sible, without letting other employees overhear you and without
drawing attention, you may want to speak with the employee about
your suspicions. His or her manner of response - visible signs of
nervousness or guilt or the giving of clearly implausible explana-
tions - may provide you with sufficient additional evidence to have
reasonable cause to believe he or she is in fact guilty.
Each situation is different, and you should always exercise your
good judgment and common sense. If you are unsure, and if you
have time before you must act, discuss your suspicions with other
supervisors or the legal department.
2. Permissible Employee Searches
If you have a reasonable cause to believe that an employee pos-
sesses stolen goods or prohibited materials, you may search the em-
ployee or his or her personal effects under the following
circumstances:
a. Plain View
You may retrieve stolen property or prohibited material from
the employee if it is in "plain view." "Plain view" simply means
that the article can be seen without opening a pocket, lunch pail,
tool box or purse. If an apparently stolen screwdriver is sticking
out of the employee's pocket, or if what looks like a marijuana ciga-
rette is stuck behind his or her ear, you may take it.
b. Authorized Searches
If the stolen goods or prohibited materials are not in "plain
view", you may search the employee and/or his or her immediate
personal effects (such as a purse, lunch pail, a personally-owned tool
box, or automobile) if the employee gives you permission. You are
entitled to ask the employee for permission for such a search.
If an employee declines your request to conduct a reasonable
search of his or her person or personal effects, you may inform him
or her that such a failure to cooperate may lead to disciplinary ac-
tion, including possible termination. If the employee persists in re-
fusing after such a warning, you should not make an involuntary
search.
c. Searches of Company-Supplied Containers
You may search lockers, tool boxes, or other containers or
storage areas which are supplied by the Company for work-related
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employee use without permission. You should, nonetheless, first
give the employee an opportunity to open the locker, tool box, etc.
before proceeding to search. Any personal effects such as wallets,
purses, or lunchboxes found within such containers or storage areas
should not be searched without the employee's permission.
3. All Searches must be Conducted in a Reasonable Manner
It is extremely important that these authorized searches be
conducted in a reasonable manner. Among other things, you
should: (1) avoid unnecessary touching of the employee's body; (2)
avoid the use of unnecessary force; (3) search only those areas in
which you have reason to believe that the article in question is lo-
cated; and (4) conduct the search in a place which will minimize
embarrassment to the employee. In addition, of course, all searches
should be conducted by a person of the same sex as the employee
being searched.
4. When Not to Search
Employee searches which are not specifically authorized above
should not be conducted. More particularly, unauthorized searches
of an employee's person or personal effects (including automobiles)
should not be made.
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APPENDIX F
FORM OF NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES OF SEARCHES
NOTICE
In order to prevent theft of Company or employee property or
use or possession of drugs or alcohol, all bags, purses, lunch boxes
and other parcels are subject to inspection whenever an employee
enters or leaves the premises.
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APPENDIX G
FORM OF NOTICE EXPLAINING LOCKER POLICY
LOCKER POLICY
The Company provides lockers for the use of its employees
during work. Each locker has a combination lock which may be
opened with the Company's master key. No other lock may be
placed on the locker.
The Company reserves the right to open and inspect the inte-
rior of each locker at any time. Prohibited materials including non-
prescribed illegal drugs, alcohol or weapons, may not be placed in
the locker. Lockers will be maintained in a neat and sanitary
condition.
The Company is not responsible for any articles in the lockers
that are lost or stolen.
